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When thinking in terms of the cold war, the tendency is to focus on 
Asia, Europe, and Africa. Only :recently has La.tip America become an in-
creasingly significant f~ctor in the relationship between the United 
States and the Sino-Soviet bloc. A p:r'imal"Y reason for the extension of 
the cold war to Latin America has been Soviet activities in Cuba, and 
United States reactions to these activities. 
It should not be surprising that the Sovi~t Union has developed an 
interest in Latin America, for the countries of that continent offer po-
tentially significant political, econdmic, .and military assets to the 
u.s.s.R. Politically, the short range Soviet goals are to decrease the 
influence that the United States has ~njoyed irt this area, to encourage 
neutralism in the cold war, and to enhance the Soviet image. 1 Econom-
ically, Soviet short range goals in Latin America are modest. To the 
extent that it is eco,nomically and politically profitable, the Soviet 
Union has attempted to increase trade, Between 1954 and 1958, the total 
value of goods traded rose from forty million dollars annually to 100 
million dollars,2 
1J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States Latin American Relations 
(Boston, 1965), p. 209,- ~ 
2Edwin Lieuwen, The United States.and the Challenge.!£_ Security in 
Latin America (Columbus, 1966), p, 25. ,___ ___ _ 
l 
The Soviet Union has been particularly interested in the military 
advantages that could be realized in several of the Latin American na-
tions, particularly in Cuba. Hanson Baldwin, noted military analyst, 
lists five advantages. 3 First, the Caribbean area potentially provides 
2 
an excellent strategic location to place shorter range ballistic missiles 
that could challenge the southern portion of the United States. Second, 
Latin American naval ports could provide valuable bases for submarines, 
refueling, and other nautical needs. A third anticipated advantage is 
the establishment of a base from which intelligence activities and sub-
version in the Western Hemisphere could be conducted. Fourth, the Ca-
ribbean area is strategically located for missile and satellite tracking 
stations. These stations would be valuable for observing the American 
space activities as well as tracking Soviet satellites. Finally 9 by in-
creasing military activities in the Western Hemisphere, the Soviet Union 
could divert Washington's attention away from other areas of even greater 
strategic significance to the Soviets, 
Latin America is on the periphery of Soviet interest, and as a re-
sult their goals are of a limited nature. The United States, however, 
has significant political, economic, and military involvement in this 
area which it considers vital to its national security. 
From the political perspective, it is noteworthy that the twenty 
countries of Latin America comprise a substantial percentage of the 
United Nations' membership. When voting as a bloc, their influence can 
be extensive. The Organization of American States4 is also a potential 
3Hanson Baldwin "A Military Perspective," in Cuba and the United 
States, ed. by John Plank (Washington, 1967), pp. 212-2Is"':""~-
4Hereafter referred to as the O.A.S. 
3 
political asset to the United States. By approving U.S. international 
activities, the O.A.S, can lend moral and legal support to those actions. 
Economically, both the American private and public sectors have been 
financially involved in Latin America, and particularly so in the Carib-
bean. In 1963, trade with Latin America surpassed three billion dollars. 
American private investment approximated eight billion dollars during 
that same year. 5 Cuba had been particularly attractive to American cap-
ital in the pre-Castro era with total investment averaging one billion 
dollars annually.6 
Latin America's size and strategic location make it militarily 
significant to the United States. In the Caribbean alone, the United 
States has a total of 20,000 men from the three branches of the armed 
forces, The Canal Zone supports ten U.S. bases and Puerto Rico is the 
host for six others. 7 Caribbean bgses are valuable as training sites 
for tropical warfare, tracking stations, r>efueling stations for naval 
and air traffic, and a means to deny use of the Panama Canal to a bellig-
erent force. South America is of less geographic value to the U.S. mili-
tary than the Caribbean. However, the high population of several of 
those countries make them potentially significant military allies. 
American interests in its Latin American neighbors necessitated a 
reaction to increased Soviet involvement in that area. J}1~ P.!!!-'J2,es~ .. 2f, 
of l};rnii:iTlg tbe scope,,,,0f,&,:t.hi.:;:L,,stu<ly.,,",. only three aspects of the response 
5Lieuwen, Challenge !E_ Security, pp. 18, 19, 
6Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, 
1966), p. 159. 
7Lieuwen, Challenge to Security, p, 10. 
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will be considered. (fi;-;t) the U.S. view of its national security in-
'----' _ __,,.· 
terests in the Caribbean area and the resulting policies will be dis-
\ cussed. 
\
.· considered from the viewpoint of official policy and is limhite~~:dsecu-
J rity considerations and closely associated corollaries. Te seco.l as-
{ pect to be considered is the role played by American military ';:;:es in 
implementing foreign policy in the region. 
,.··.:'_.,,-.,,.--·.-,o..:,·,:,c.<-....,_, 
The th(~.rd asp~1ct considers 
.,,.,, ___ ---=-"'/'""~·~·-·~"' 
the contribution, if any, of the organization of American States to the 
U.S. effort. 
_rour hypotb~ses emerged f!'oil!_an initial survey of available litera-
1:.:,i};\?.:7:,,"~,;:;.,,;;-,. ·:.:, ,.,::•_,. --' :.,;\:: '.;_ ··:·_: .. _·_ ,:_c;~,'-"'·:'),;;:.;11)>":;i;,:.,;,i;J:•:.,:~.C~k-~~ut_::);,,.;_t~,~,::,.;:,2;,;:~Jt;:'.:f.-\;•'.,_ ;-r ~·,~·;;'['-;/,.:,/'.:_ '''.'. -~ .-:,.:. -;, .. , ".-/t_::;;.:~;_,;,. __ • ,.'.':.·. {: ,:, .. :,,:.:.'i.~ ... \·t·::•-:(-·,n;o; .-_. :. , ?-_,, ,, ,(-~<::'. .. ,,~~·>· ~':.]::-,\1;~"··!'·· 
ture. 
,,:s~···--c~;:<;) while a form of communism has come to power in Cuba, American 
policy has been moderately successful in limiting the gains of the Soviet 
Union in the state. 
\£;:o-:"\u. S. policy in Cuba has been guided by clearly stated interests /I ~,~,,,.,,-
that are considered to be vital to national security by United States 
policy makers. 
,,#'"'."'' 
'],f'nree,\American policy in Cuba has been enhanced by a superior mili-
, l 
~,../ 
tary posture with respect to the Caribbean area. 
(;:;;":) the actions and resolutions of the Organization of American 
\~~:¥0l. 
States have served to reinforce U.S. efforts to frustrate Soviet goals 
in Cuba. 
While the first hypothesis is of a rather general nature, it is 
limited by the three areas with which this paper is concerned. The last 
three hypotheses relate to each of these aspects respectively. 
In order to limit the scope of this investigation further, three 
limitations are applied. First, only the American reaction to Soviet 
5 
influence in Cuba will be considered. Chinese influence is recognized, 
but largely ignored. Likewise, an attempt is made to separate U.S. pol-
icy regarding th~ Soviet Union's presence in Cuba from the U.S. Cuban 
policy in general. While there is of necessity, a degree of overlap, 
this thesis focuses on tpe Soviet issue. A second limitation is geo-
graphic .. Only Cuba or other areas directly effected by Cuba are consid-
ered. No attempt is made, for example, to treat communist threats else-
where in Latin America except to the extent that it sheds light on the 
Cuban problem. Finally, the United States - Soviet dispute is treated 
as a classical power struggle, While ideology is certainly a worthy 
criterion by which to evaluate the conflict, this study leaves that ap-
proach to other researchers. 
There are at least two criteria useful in evaluating a nation's 
foreign policy: what that nation does and what that nation says it will 
do. In this paper the writer concerns himself with both concepts in an 
""'"·'-""''-"=-c<~.,;cr;,ip- ,,·y~ ~.-,-x--:,,,,s-,..;::i;i,~$-r ·--. ·:··:-,)%'1\~··;c-~·,v,,-
many State Department documents are used, Of special significance are 
--...,, 
the State Department Bulletin and the State Department Inter-American 
Series. Documents of the Pan American Union also proved valuable. The 
selected bibliography is complemented by various analytical articles and 
books, and by assorted documentary sources. 
The first chapter provides historical background of American atti-
tudes and policies in Latin America. Particular emphasis is given to 
the role of the Monroe Doctrine in U,S. policy, and to the American re-
action to suspected communism in Guatemala in 1954. The next chapter 
deals with the intense interest that the United States has had toward 
Cuba and the effects of this interest, both on United States' policy and 
on the attitudes of other nations dealing with Cuba. The subsequent 
chapter discusses the effect that American military forces have had on 
U.S. relations with Cuba and conversely, the effect that relationship 
6 
has had on American military forces. A fourth chapter deals with the re-
action of the Organization of Am~rican States to Soviet influence in 
Cuba. The fifth chapter is a case study and considers the Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962 with respect to the three areas of concern of this study. 
The conflict is brought up to date in the sixth chapter which discusses 
the subject matter from the time of the missile crisis to the present. 
The final chapter concludes the study and examines the validity of the 
hypotheses. 
CHAPTER lI 
EVOLUTION OF UNlTED STATES POLICY 
Unquestionably the rise to power of Castro and the concomitant 
growth of Soviet influence in Cuba posed new problems and dilemmas for 
American policy makers. However, the situation was not considered in a 
vacuum. To a large extent, U.S. policy was influenced by traditional 
interests in the Latin American area and what was considered by Washing-
ton to be threats to those interests. 
Two areas are of particular relevance with respect to the Cuban 
question. First is the Monroe Doctrine, a major cornerpost of American 
policy. Despite the controversial nature of the Monroe Doctrine, it is 
difficult to discuss even a segment of the U.S. Latin American policy 
without reference to that doctrine. The second area of concern is Amer-
ican reaction to what it viewed as growing communism within the hemi-
sphere. The Guatemalan problem of 1954 will be analyzed as the most 
significant pre-Castro example of the intensity of U.S. oppoeition to 
hemispheric communism. 
The Monroe Doctrine 
In speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, Gaston Nerval emphasises the 
significance of that policy to inter-American affairs. 
I discovered some time ago that all roads lead to the 
Monroe Doctrine. There was no problem of Pan Amer.j.-
canism, political or economic, which has not been, in 
one way or another, related to the Monroe Doctrine or 
7 
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one of its multiple derivatives.l 
The Monroe Doctrine has been essentially a policy of national interest. 
Although many diverse and complex interpretations have been given to this 
doctrine, its national security implications have remained as a central 
feature. For this reason, the Monroe Doctrine is a cogent concern even 
to the present day. The original doctrine was probably not meant to be 
a doctrine at all, but rather a response to a specific threat,2 That is, 
it was an attempt to discourage any imperialistic tendencies that France 
or Russia might have had toward the Western Hemisphere. 
Four basic principles were stated in the doctrine regarding Ameri-
can foreign policyt First the Western Hemisphere is not to be consider-
ed as subject to further colonization by European powers. 
In the discussions to which this interest has given 
rise and in the arrangements by which they may term-
inate the occasion has been judged proper for assert-
ing, as a principle in which.the rights and interests 
of the United States are involved,, that the American 
continents, by the free and independent condition 
which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth 
not to be considered as subjects for future coloni-
zation by any European powers.3 
Second, the United States would remain aloof from European affairs. 
p. v. 
In the wars of the European powers in matters relat-
ing to themselves, we have never taken any part nor 
does it comport with our policy to do so.4 
lGaston Nerval, Autopsy~ the Monroe Doctrine (New York, 1934), 
2Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1955), 
p O 9 0 
3President Monroe's Seventh Annual Message to Congress, 2 Dec., 
1823, in A, G. Mezerik, ed., Cuba and~ United States (New York, 
1960), I, p. 45. 
4Ibid. 
Third, an extension of the "European system" would be a threat to the 
United States. However, the term "European system" was undefined and 
vague~ 
We owe it, therefore, to candor and the amicable 
relations existing between the United States and 
these powers to declare that we should consider any 
attempt on their part to extend their system to any 
portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our 
peace and safety. With the existing colonies or 
dependencies of any European power, we have not 
interfered and shall not interfere.5 
9 
Fourth, the United States proclaimed that they would not intervene in the 
internal affairs of Latin America. 
It is still the true policy of the United States to 
leave the parties to themselves, in the hofe that 
other powers will pursue the same courses. 
The bases of the Monroe Doctrine were the concepts of isolation and 
non-intervention. 7 It will be shown, though, that the doctrine maintain-
ed at least part of its significance long after the premises were no 
longer valid due to the basic security orientation of the doctrine. In 
the 1830s and 1840s, this dictum was not invoked although France and 
Great Britain interfered in Latin America. France intervened in Mexican 
and Argentine affairs in order to improve their trade position in these 
countries. England was similarly involved in Argentina and Brazil. 
Perhaps the most blatc;1nt intervention was a joint naval blockade of a 
portion of Argentina by England and France in 1845. The blockade lasted 
6Ibid., p. 46. 
7Mecham, ! Survey of United States Latin American Relations 
(Boston, 1965), p. 39. """see also Donald M. Dozer, The Monroe Doctrine 
Its Modern Significance (New York, 1965), p. 6, ancf'1ierkins, Monroe 
Doctrine, pp. 5, 19. 
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three years and unsuccessfully attempted to force Manuel Rosas, governor 
of Buenos Aires, to open unrestricted trade between Europe and the Rio 
Plata area. The United States was indifferent to the intervention as 
Washington did not view it as a direct challenge to American national 
intel:'est. 8 
During the remainder of the nineteenth century and through the 
first third of the twentieth century, the Monroe Doctrine was subjected 
to several changes and additions that more or less followed the course 
of U.S. foreign policy. In every case, the change reflected the then 
current view of national security interests. In 1857, the no-transfer 
principle was added to the U.S. Latin American policy. 9 By this addi-
tion, the United States disallowed the transfer of a Latin American 
colony from one foreign power to another, In 1895, the United States 
felt threatened by a British-Venezuelan l:>order dispute in which Great 
Britain was holding a portion of Venezuelan territory. Washington poli-
cy makers forced arbitration in this matter by means of an audacious 
note which stated, in part, that American interest and honor were at 
stake, that the. Monroe Doctrine was applicable, and that to allow the 
subjugation of any Latin Americ;:an nation would be against U.S. national 
interests. It further stated that, · 
Today the United States is practically soveX'eign on 
this continent, and its fiat is law upon the sub-
jects to which it confines its interposition.10 
8Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, pp, 72, 73. 
9Mecham, Latin American Relations, p. 62. 
lORichard Olney, Memo to Thomas F. Bayard, July 20, 1895, in James 
W. Gantenbein, ed., The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy A 
Documentary Record (New York, 1950), 'pp.'" 340-354. 
11 
The so called Roosevelt Corollary further distorted the original 
meaning of the Monroe Doctrine. Although J, Reuben Clark later rejected 
the Roosevelt dictum as an integral part of the Monroe Doctrine, it is 
significant that Roosevelt distorted the doctrine to provide justifica-
tion for his policies.11 The two major changes introduced by the Roose-
velt Corollary were that the Monroe Doctrine was in fact a guarantee of 
the commercial independence of the Americas,12 and that the United States 
possessed the right to intervene in Latin America in cases of flagrant 
wrongdoings.13 The Roosevelt Corollary is another example of the rela-
tionship between the Monroe Doctrine and the American view of its essen-
tial national interests concerning Latin America. 
In 1928, J. Reuben Clark wtote a comprehensive memorandum concern-
ing the Monroe Doctrine and its many derivatives. A major thesis of 
this document was that the Monroe Doctrine had been on occasion distorted 
to justify all matters of national self interest. Clark's position was 
that the doctrine should not be so broadly interpreted although it cer-
tainly pertained to national interest to some degree. 14 
llu,s. Department of State, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, by 
J. Reuben Clark, State Dept. Pub. No. 37 (Washington, 1928), p. xxiii. 
12President Roosevelt's First Annual Message to Congress, 1901, in 
Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Readings in American Foreign Policy (New York, 
1959), p. 198. 
13Theodore Roosevelt, Fourth Annual Message to Congress, 1904, in 
ibid. The message, in part, reads "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence 
which results in a general lowering of the ties of civilized society, 
may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some 
civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the 
United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, how-
ever reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to 
the exercise of an international police power .•• " 
l~u.s. Department of State, Memorandum, p, xxi. 
12 
The Clark Memorandum sought to end the era of free wheeling inter-
pretations of the Monroe Doctrine, and raised the question of future 
applicability of the doctrine, Hiram Bingham, for example, wrote a book 
in 1928 describing it as an "obsolete shillobeth." Interestingly enough, 
however, he changed his mind several years after the writing of the book. 
The doctrine is at times dormant and at times applicable depending on 
the American concept of external threats to the hemisphere. For example, 
it was referred to extensively in the 1954 Guatemalen situation. Again, 
in 1960, when Chairman Khrushchev declared the doctrine to be dead of 
old age, the State Department responded vigorously declaring it very 
much alive and in fact claiming a multilateralism for it. 15 The Cuban 
problem has, of course, been a challenge to the doctrine and it has been 
cited on several occasions in regard to that island.16 Since World War 
II, it appears that the Monroe Doctrine has grown in significance due to 
an increase in external threats to the Western Hemisphere. 
It is interesting to note that although the original foreign policy 
bases of the doctrine, namely isolation and non-involvement, have become 
obsolete, the doctrine has continued as an important policy considera-
tion. It has become institutionalized as an American policy toward alien 
powers with designs on Latin America. Several authors have intimated 
15u.s. Department of State, "U.S. Reaffirms Principle of Monroe 
Doctrine," State Department ~ulletin, August 1, 1960, pp. 170, 171. 
16william A. Williams, The United States, Cuba, and Castro (New 
York, 1962), p. 176. Mr. Williams states that ttie""u.S:--invasion of 
Cuba was consistent with the Monroe Doctrine, immoral a doctrine though 
it may be. See also J, Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-
American Security, 1889-1960 (Austin, 1961), p. 462, "Inview of the 
heavy Soviet rearmament of Cuba, and the island republic's absorption 
into the Communist bloc, the time is rapidly approaching when the United 
States will have to decide whether the Monroe Doctrine has been violated 
and whether it is worth defending." 
13 
that the Monroe Doctrine is dead. Its recent use seems to negate that 
possibility. It does seem, however, that it varies in significance de-
pending on the intensity of threats on the Western Hemisphere. Dexter 
Perkins, in his analysis of the Monroe Doctrine, states that the inter-
national situation and the position of the O.A.S. tend to lessen the in-
fluence of the doctrine when no crisis exists, but he cites the Guate-
malan situation as a crisis which brought the doctrine very much to the 
foreground. 17 He further states that hemispheric cooperation does not 
make the doctrine obsolete. 18 Some interesting statistics bring this 
point out even more clearly. In April of 1937 a questionnaire was sent 
out to a random sampling in the United States asking if the r.espondants 
would be in favor of the United States defending by force any Latin 
American country from foreign attack. The responses were 28.7 per cent 
yes, 61.9 per cent no, 9,9 per cent don't know. A few years later, with 
a more critical wor'ld situation, the following question was asked, "If 
a major foreign power actually threatened to take over any of the follow-
ing places by arm~d invasion, would you be willing to see United States 
come to the rescue with prmed forc;:es?". The countries mentioned were 
Canada, Mexico, and Brazil. The affirmative responses in January 1939, 
were 73 per cent for Canada, 43 per cent for Mexico, and 27 per cent for 
Brazil. By August of 1940 this had changed to 87 per cent for Canada, 
76.5 per cent for Mexico, and 54.7 per cent for Brazil. 19 From these 
figures it seems that support for the doctrine is relative to where and 
17Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p. 369. 
18 Ibid. , p. 3 77 , 
19Perkins, Monroe Doctrine, p, 377. 
14 
when it is applied. This leads us back to the basic tenent of the 
Monroe Doctrine, hemispheric security. 
Of the four principles expounded in the original Monroe proclama-
tion, the two concerned with United States non-intervention in Latin 
America and Europe have lost their original meaning. Whenever the 
United States considered its security to be threatened, the United 
States interfered and intervened as necessary to protect its interests. 
The two remaining principles, non-colonization and the prohibition of 
the extension of a European system to the Western Hemisphere, have re-
mained intact. This raises the prqblem of blatantly ignoring one por-
tion of the doctrine while enforcing another. The justification lies in 
the American concern with national security. As J, Reuben Clark pointed 
out in his memorandum, the Roosevelt Corollary was not justified by the 
Monroe Doctrine, but was justified on the basis of national self-interest 
as interpreted by the United States.20 This is the single thread running 
through the doctrine's diverse history, giving it coherence and unity. 
Reaction To Communism: Guatemala 
The United States considers communist presence in the hemisphere to 
be dangerous to its national security. The present U.S. Latin American 
policy has been developed around defeating the real and imagined aggres-
siveness of the Soviet Union. 
Our greatest challenge in Latin America since World 
War II has been that of presenting a hemispheric 
front against the threats posed by international 
communism. The United States has been single minded 
in this purpose; all else has been subordinated to 
this objective. The threat is viewed as an external 
20u.s. Department of State, Memorandum, p. xxiii. 
one which must be opposed by political and military 
means.21 
15 
This section will focus on Guatemala as a case study of U.S. reaction to 
an alleged communist threat. Tnis conflict most closely approximates 
the Cuban problem, at least in its earliest stages. Guatemala is par-
ticularly interesting as it posed a definite threat to the Monroe Doc-
trine based on the American assumption that a relationship between the 
Guatemalan government and Soviet Communism did exist. 22 American re-
action took the form of limited action and a strong propaganda campaign. 
From 1944 to 1954, the Guatemalan government became increasingly 
leftist in its political orientation. By 1954, the United States sus-
pected that communists, or communist sympathizers, had control of the 
government, and that leading officials were members of communist front 
groups. The president's wife was the leader of the National Women's 
Alliance, an affiliation of the Communist International Federation of 
Women. The President of the Guatemalan Congress was head of the Guate-
malan Pe~ce Committee, a communist front organization,23 Finally in 
1954, Czecholovakia sent arms to the Arbenz government. By that time, 
the United States had instigated a massive propaganda campaign. 
The propaganda campaign took two forms; one was an assortment of 
statements by the State Department, and the other was an attempt to in-
fluence the Tenth Inter-American Conference convened at Caracas. 
In July of 1954, after the crisis, the State Department stated the 
21Mecham, Latin American Relations, p, 466, 
22Mecham, Inter-American Security, p. 440. 
23Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, 
1957), p. 362. 
following: 
The master plan of international communism is to gain 
a solid political base in the hemisphere, a base that 
can be used to extend communist penetration to the 
other peoples of the other American governments.24 
John E. Peurifoy, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala said: 
In proving that communism can be defeated, we relied 
on the traditional American principle of honesty in 
the conduct of foreign affairs and the American doc-
trine of continental liberty from despotic interven-
tion~ first enunciated by President Monroe 131 years 
ago.LS 
I n 1957, the State Department published a paper reviewing the role of 
16 
international communism in Guatemala, In this pamphlet they used Soviet 
publications to show communist involvement.26 
At the Caracas conference, the American goal was to obtain a strong 
resolution condemning communism and the situation in Guatemala. The 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, appeared personally and stated: 
What I suggest does not involve any interference in 
the internal affairs of any American Republic. There 
i s ample room for national differences and for toler-
ances between the political institutions of the differ-
ent American States. But there is no place here for 
political institutions which serve alien masters. I 
hope we can agree to make that clear.27 
It is difficult to evaluate how influential the United States was 
in the overthrow of the Arbenz government. Estimates range from mere 
24u.s. Department of State, "International Communism in Guatemala," 
by John Foster Dulles, State Department Bulletin, July 12, 1957, p. 43. 
25Ibid., "Meeting the Communist Challenge in the Western Hemisphere, " 
by John E. Peurifoy, State Department Bulletin, September 6, 1954, p, 336. 
26u.s. Department of State,~ Case History of Communi st Penetration 
in Guatemala, Inter-American Series No. 52 (Washington, 1957), pp, 66-68. 
27council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Poli-
~' 1954 (Washington, 1955), p, 408, 
17 
nonsupport of the government to a Central Intelligence Agency instigated 
invasion. In any case, it seems that Washington was quite pleased when 
Armas invaded and overthrew the government, It is known that U.S. arms 
were sent to Honduras and Nicaragua, supposedly for defense against the 
Guatemalan invasion. It is further known that those arms found their 
way to Armas' army of invaders, Robert Alexander, a leading observer of 
communist affairs in the Americas, has stated that the invasion could 
not have been successful without U.S. moral, political, and diplomatic 
support. 28 The U.S. Ambassador, John Peurifoy, may have been influen-
tial in Arbenz' downfal1. 29 It is not only difficult to determine what 
role the United State~ did actually play, it is even more difficult to 
speculate what it would have·done had the invasion not been successful. 
Two points are obvious from this short discussion of Guatemala. 
First, communist regimes were considered by the United States to be a 
threat to hemispheric security and the:refore a threat to its own secur-
ity. The State Department called the communist infiltration a direct 
challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. 30 It also published an abundancy of 
material condemning communism in this hemisphere. Secondly, the United 
States was disturbed enough about communism to attempt to counteract it. 
The ultimate extent to which the United States would have gone is un-
predictable. It is interesting to note, however, that Ambassador Lodge, 
in addressing the Soviet representative in the United Nations, said: 
28Alexander, Communism, p. 383. 
29Dexter Perkins, The United States~~ Caribbean (Cambridge, 
1966), p, 134, 
30u,s. Department of State, Ameri~ Foreign Policy 1950-1955, I 
(Washington, 1957), p, 1312. 
I say to you, representative of the Soviet Union, 
stay out of the hemisphere and don't try to start 
your pl~ns and your conspiracies over here.31 
18 
That they did not heed this warning is attested to by events a few years 
later. 
31Alexander, Communism, p. 382. 
CHAPTER III 
UNITED STATES POLICY: CONFLICTS OF NATIONAL INTEREST 
There is reason to suspect that American interests in Latin-Ameri-
can countries are in direct proportion to their proximity to American 
shores. For this reason and others, Cuba has played a vital role in the 
international life of the United States. As early as 1609, Jefferson 
expressed an interest in apquiring Cuba as a territory of the United 
States. 1 Involvement with Cuba, however, was generally sporadic until 
considerations of a transoceanic canal reinforced the interest of the 
United States toward the Caribbean in the latter part of the 19th cen-
tury.2 Since that time, Cuba has been considered vital to American 
interests, an9 U.S. policy reflects that Washington has recognized 
Cuba's significance. 
Cuban-American Relations, 1898-1959 
In 1898, two events occurred which intensified United States' in-
terest in Cuba. The first was the publishing of a book by Alfred T. 
Mahan in which he clarified the strategic significance of Cuba to the 
United States. 
1Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge, 
1966), p. 92. 
2Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 
1900-1921 (Princeton, 196'+), p. s.-
19 
It may be added here that the phenomena of the long, 
narrow peninsula of Florida, with its strait, is 
reproduced ·successfully in Cuba, Haiti, and Puerto 
Rico, with the passag~s dividing them. The whole 
together forms one big barri~r, the strategic signi-
ficance of which cannot b~ overlooked or its effect 
upon the Caribbean; while the Gulf of Mexico is 
assigned to absolute seclusion by it, if the pas-
sages are in hostile control.3 
Undoubtedly this assertion ha~ a profound effect on American policy 
makers, especially Theodore Roosevelt. 
20 
The second ~vent of importance ~as the military involvement in Cuba 
during the Spanish-American War. United States' entry into the war was 
probably based on a larg~ number of conflicting and complex reasons. In 
a message to Congress, P~esident McKinley listed four official purposes. 
They were to put an end to the barbarities and bloodshed, to protect 
American citizens, to protect U.S. commercial interests, and to protect 
the peace and security of the United States. In this same message, 
President McKinley mentipned in passing that Spain had already agreed to 
meet all of the U.S. demands. 4 The conciliatory attitudes of the Span-
ish did not seem to affect Congress and war was declared. 
The war was not provoked by executive fiat; rather, the American 
society as a whole was attuned to Cuba and its problems with Spain. The 
activities of the American press added to the p~evalent bellicose atti-
tude of the nation~ The American busiijess sector was also very much 
represented by an enterprising.group that attempted to arbitrate the 
3Alfred T. Mahan, The Interest of America in~ Power (Boston, 
1898), p. 305. 
4President McKinley's Message to Congress, April 11, 1898, in 
William Fitz,gibbQn, Cuba and the United States 1900-1935 (New York, 
1964), p •. ~67. - - -
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Cuban-Spanish dispute for a monetary profit.5 Politicians further exac-
erbated the tension between Spain and the United States by frequent ref-
erences to the Monroe Doctrine. 6 
The Spanish-American war demonstrated two facts that are pertinent 
to this discussion. First, by 1898 the United States considered Cuba 
to be a neighbor of considerable significance to U.S. national interest. 
The United States apparently intended to gain influence in Cuba by war 
or by outright purchase. 7 Second, the United States demonstrated a 
willingness, perhaps even an eagerness in this case, to use military 
force to further its national interest. It was not to be the last time 
that military forces were significant in promoting U.S. purposes in Cuba, 
After the war, the United States relegated Cuba to a position of an 
Ameri~~n protectorate. The relationship was formalized by the Platt 
Amendment of 1902. By this declaration the United States assumed power 
of intervention, established certain U.S. military rights in Cuba~ and 
gained economic control. An article of particular significance with 
respect to the later Soviet-American conflict over Cuba read as follows: 
That the government of Cuba shall never enter into 
any treaty or other compact with the foreign power 
or powers which will impair or tend to impair the 
independence of Cuba, or in any manner authorize or 
permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by 
colonization or, for military or naval purposes or 
otherwise, lodgement in or control over any portion 
5David F. Healy, The United States in~ 1898-1902 (Madison, 
1963), p. 206. 
6Norman E, Bailey, ed., Latin American Policy and Hemispheric 
Security (New York, 1965), p. 135, 
7Leland Jenks, Our Cuban Colony (New York, 1928), pp. 45-48, 
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of said island.a 
Although the Platt Amendment was revoked prior to Castro's rise to power, 
the United States acted as though the article quoted above was still a 
consideration. 
Cuba remained as an American protectorate under the provisions of 
the Platt Amendment until 1934. During this period, American goals were 
to promote political stability, to foster economic growth, and to in-
crease American economic ties with Cuba. Politically, the United States 
intervened periodically, particularly with respect to elections. In 
1906, Cuba was unable to conduct legitimate elections due to disruptions 
by a rebellious group. The incumbent president, Estrada Palma, asked 
for and received U.S. help. The United States cited the Platt Amendment 
and established a provisional government under William H. Taft. 9 Again 
in 1916, Cuba was confronted with an election problem caused by rebel-
lious factors. This time, the problem was resolved without United States 
aid. Again, however, in the 1920 election, the United States suspected 
that the victorious party used foul play to win the election. Accord-
ingly, an American advisor was dispatched to Cuba to conduct new elec-
tions and "aid" the Cub<iin prei,;;ident after the elections. 10 
American economic control prob~bly tied Cuba to the United States 
even more than political control. Total investment grew from twenty 
8u.s. Congress, Senate, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional 
Record, XXXIV, 2954. 
9Ralph Eldin Minger, "William H. Taft 1:md the United States Inter-
vention in Cuba in 1906'', .!.£!_ Hispanic American Historical Review, 
February, 1961, p, 85. 
lOMunro, Intervention, p, 504. 
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million dollars in 1914 to more than one billion dollars by 1927. 11 The 
sugar industry became completely dependent on American interests both 
from the perspectives of investment and exports. After political inde-
pendence in 1934, American investment continued to grow. Until the rise 
to power of Castro in 1959, the American investment in Cuba was larger 
than elsewhere in the Caribl:>ean. 12 
The years between 1934 and 1959 constituted a relatively quiet 
period in Cuban-Ame~ican relations. The United States was prospering 
economically from the ;pelationship, and Cuba economic status increased 
stead,ily. The United States supported Fulgencio Batista as he repre-
sented stability and cooperation, the major goals of the U.S. Cuban pol-
icy.13 During this period, Batista served as Chief-of-Staff of the Army 11 
as President twice, and as the significant political force behind the 
scene when not in office. There is considerable debate as to the U.S. 
role in the Batista-Castro conflict. Some authors find fault with Amer~ 
ican policy due to supposed support for Batista, and others for supposed 
support of Castro. 14 Clearly, until the advent of Castro in 1959, the 
United States considered Cuba to be within their sphere of influence and 
subject to their meddlings. 
Even a cursory study of early United States-Cuban relations should 
corroborate two major points. First, the United States has been 
11Perkins, Caribbean, p, 159. 
12Ibid., p. 161. 
13Robert F. Smith, The United States and Cuba (New York, 1960), 
p, 171. 
14For conflicting opinions see ibid. and Earl E.T. Smith, The 
Fourth Floor (New York, 19q2). 
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interested in Cuba; Cuba was rightfully called the most important small 
ally of the United States. 15 Second, the United States demonstrated a 
willingness to intervene in order to protect its interests. The U.S. 
established itself in Cuba and enforced limits on Cuba's economic, polit-
ical and social affairs from 1898 to 1959. 
The Conflict With The Soviet Union 
As could be expected, Castro's l"'ise to power did not diminish U.S. 
interest in that island. To the contrary, the implicit threat of Castro-
ism to American national security accentuated the almost proprietary in-
volvement of the United States. 
At first review, the spectre of the colossus United States, with 
all its vast resources, battling an impoverished revolutionary regime 
would seem to assume the aspect$ of a David and Goliath struggle. O.A.S. 
reactions indicate that this image struck a sympathetic note in the Latin 
American countries. Gastro did prove to be.a quick and adept irritant to 
the United States. Of course, the confrontation was soon between the 
United States a,nd the Soviet Union, and Cuba was reduced essentially to 
a partisan spectator. 
The 1960 Declaration of San Jose was considered irresolute U.S. pol-
icy makers and revealed to them that the O.A.S. was going to be of lim-
ited use in its ca.mpaign against hemispheric communism. 16 Therefore, a 
continued emphasis was placed on unilateral action to defend the hemi-
sphere against what the United States viewed as communist threats. 
15Minger, "Taft," p. 7 5. 
16Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy in Latin America (New York, 
1965), p. 96. 
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Direct action, indirect action, propaganda, and threats were mixed in 
liberal dosages to achieve the blend of American unilateral policy to-
ward Soviet involvement in Cuba. 
The most overt testimonial to American interest was the ill-fated 
Bay of Pigs invasion. As early as March of 1960, President Eisenhower 
had approved American assistance for a Cuban exile army that would in-
vade the Cuban island utilizing anti-Castroites in Cuba, and overthrow 
the Castro regime. Accounts of the invasion and the political maneuver-
ing involved are both plentiful and conflicting. 17 
While the details of the invasion are not important for this dis-
cussion, the incident is vital to an understanding of the extent of U.S. 
involvement in Cuba. Two extreme points of view can be taken. It can 
be considered that the invasion indicates an almost messianic purpose to 
U.S. attempts to rid the hemisphere of communism. Conversely, some 
might argue that the political dissent involved in the decision and the 
lack of support by American military forces indicate that the United 
States did not consider Cuba to be vital to American national interest. 
In any ca.se, the United States executed the plan with full knowledge of 
possiblE) consequences indicating that Kennedy felt a commitment to de-
fend the hemisphere, On April 18, 1961, one day after the invasion, 
President Kennedy warned Russia that the United States was prepared to 
"honor its obligatiop under the inter-American system" in case of "mili-
tary intervention by an outside force". The Illustrated London News 
noted the threat and predicted that the Soviet Union would act 
17see especially, Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, The Cuban Invasion 
(New York, 1962), and Haynes Johnson, The Bay£!_ Pigs (New York, 1954), 
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accordingly. 18 Why, then, did the Soviets not act accordingly? Quite 
possibly, the uncertainty and maladroitness involved in execution of the 
Bay of Pigs affair was on the whole more encouraging to the Soviets than 
discouraging. 
It is probable that the failure of the 1961 invasion caused a few 
convulsive shudders among American policy makers. However, this author 
believes that Theodore Draper has probably overstated his case when he 
commented that the Bay of Pigs fiasco paralyzed U.S. policy for greater 
19 than a year. 
The Unit~d States engaged in two other retaliatory actions prior to 
the missile crisis. The first was economic and the second was military. 
On July 6, 1960, President Eisenhower caused a crisis to Cuba's sugar 
industry by reducing the U.S. quota. The Soviet Union, however, immedi-
ately assumed the burden of economic support of the sugar crop, thereby 
relieving some of the pressures on the Cuban economy. In November of 
1960, the U.S. military action resulted from a request by Nicaragua and 
Guatemala for U.S. naval aid for the purpose of protecting them against 
invasion by sea from Cuba. The United States complied despite protests 
from other Latin American countries. 20 
It was on the propaganda front rather than positive actions that 
the United States best expressed its vital interest in eliminating, or 
at least reducing, Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere. The 
18cyril Falls, "Fidel Castro at Bay," The Illustrated London News, 
April 29, 1961, p, 700. 
19Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York, 1965), 
p. 135 0 
20J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-Hemispheric Security, 
1889-1960 (Austin, 1961)~. 462. 
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propaganda took the form of written anti-Castro documents and direct and 
tacit warnings. 
During the 1960 and 1962 period, the State Department constantly 
referred to either Castro or the Soviet Union's relations with Castro. 
In the State Department Bulletin of March 28, 1960, President Eisenhower 
stated: 
Many people do not realize tqe United States is just 
as committed as are the other Republics to the prin-
ciple of the Rio Treaty of 1947. This treaty declar-
ed that an attack on one American Republic will be in 
effe~t an at;yck on all. We stand firmly by this 
committment. 
On August 29, 1960 the Bulletin proclaimed: 
It is clear that the Soviet campaign has certain 
specific aims. They want to undermine the influence 
of freedom and democracy in lesser developed areas. 
Ultimately, they hope to achieve two of their basic 
objectives. These are to bring about the withdrawal 
of all U.S. forces overseas and to produce the dis-
solution of re.gional security pacts, in particular 
22 NATO, but also the O.A.S ••.. 
Later that year the State Department published.a lengthy memorandum 
entitled Provacative Actions of~ Government£!. Cuba Against the 
United States Which Have Served to Increase Tensions in the Caribbean 
Area.23 Two more important documents are entitled, Inter-American 
21u.s. Department of State, "Toward Mutual Understanding Among the 
Americas," by President Eisenhower, State Department Bulletin, March 28, 
1960, p. 472. 
22Ibid., "Responsibility of Cuban Government for Increased Inter-
national Tension in the Hemisphere," State Department Bulletin, August 
29, 1960, p, 340. 
23Ibid., "Provocative Actions of the Government of Cuba Against the 
United States Which Have Served ta Increase Tensions in the Caribbean 
Area," State Department Bulletin, July 18, 1960, pp. 79-88. 
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Efforts to. Relieve International Tension in the Western Hemisphere.24 
and simply Cuba. 25 The latter is also known as the White Paper on Cuba 
and was brilliantly authored by Arthur Schlesinger. The titles of the 
first two documents indicate the nature of their contents. Schlesinger's 
work depicts the betrayal of the Cuban revolution by Castro. The list 
of informational efforts describing official U.S. thinking could go on 
indefinitely. Suffice it to say that the United States adequately ex-
pressed its displeasure at events in Cu~a. 
The United States - Soviet conflict over Cuba was characterized by 
warnings which were issued back and forth at an astounding rate. On 
July 9, 1960, for example, President Eisenhower cited the Monroe Doctrine 
and warned that the United States would never permit a communist domin-
ated regime in this hemisphere. 26 Chairman Khrushchev replied by declar-
ing that the Monroe Doctrine was dead. 27 The warnings continued at a 
relatively subdued rate until September of 1962. At this time, the tempo 
and intensity showed a marked escalation. On September 13, President 
Kennedy announced: 
If at any time the Communist build up in Cuba were to 
endanger or interfere with our security in any way, 
including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the 
Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at 
Cape Canaveral, or the lives of our citizens in this 
country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its 
24Ibid., .Inter-American Efforts to Relieve International Tension in 
the Western Hemisphere, Inter-America~Series No. 79 (Washington, 19611:" 
25 Ibid., ~uba, by Arthur Schlesinger, Inter-American Series No. 66 
(Washington, 1961). 




aggressive purposes by force or by the threat of 
force against any nation in this hemisphere, or 
become an offensive military base of significant 
capacity for the Soviet Union, then this society 
will do whatever must be done to protect its own 
security and that of its allies.28 
This warning was reinforced by an executive request to Congress for 
authority to call up 150,000 reservists, Congress added prestige to the 
warning by adopting a joint resolution to: 
1. prevent by whatever means may be necessary; in-
cluding the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist 
regime in Cuba f~om extending by force or threat 
of force its aggressive or subversive activities 
to any part of this hemisphere; 
2. prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an exter-
nally supported military capabilit; endangering 
the securi1;y of the United States; 9 
In retrospect, the American policy toward Cuba in this century in-
dicates an intense interest in that island republic. Since Castro 9 this 
interest has been inexoJ:1ably tied to American national security by U.S. 
policy makers. Since the beginning of Soviet influence in Cuba, the 
United States clearly expressed its concern over that influence. The 
Bay of Pigs incident, the economic sanctions, and numerous warnings to 
the Soviet Union were integral parts of an overall policy. That policy 
was to minimize the effects of the Soviet presence in Cuba. The limits 
of expectation of the policy ranged from a maximum hope of eliminating 
Soviet influence altogether and a minimum determination to prevent Soviet 
influence from becoming detrimental to the national security of the 
United States. Despite the numerous warnings and other indications of 
American interest in Cuba, the Soviet Union chose to send missiles to 
28Roger Hilsman, To~~ Nation (Garden City, 1967), p. 17 
29Mezerik 
' Cuba, p. 24. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MILITARY ROLE: POWER AND CREDIBILITY 
American policy toward Soviet involvement in Cuba was influenced by 
its intense and long standing national interest in Cuba. However, in 
the political interplay of nations, national interest is not the sole 
determinant of foreign policy. This chapter considers the effects that 
relative military power and force structures have had in influencing U.S. 
policy in Cuba. Traditionally, the problem of evaluating relative mili-
tary strength was comparatively straightforward. The nation which could 
mobilize the greatest military force in the contested area won an advan-
tage over its opponent. However, nuclear weapons, with their far-reach-
ing and devastating capabilities, introduced new and complex considera-
tions that necessitated a new approach to the military force structure. 
The Pre-Nuclear Role of the Military · 
The Monroe Doctrine declared that the United States would not allow 
European nations to increase their influence in the Western Hemisphere. 
An implication of this declaration was that the Un~ted States did, in 
fact, have sufficient military power to prevent the Europeans from engag-
ing in actions prohipited by the Monroe Doctrine. While this was proba-
bly not the case in 1823, indications were that Great Britain was pre-
pared to lend its awesome naval might in support of the doctrine, at 
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least to the extent that England's interest was involved.l 
During the 19th century, the Latin American policy of the United 
States became more aggressive as the United States developed as a more 
significant world power. In 1845, President Polk reasserted the valid-
ity of the Monroe Doctrine and implied that the United States was pre-
pared to assume a more forceful role in protecting its hemispheric in-
terests.2 In this same period, the United States used force to impose 
its dictates on Mexico. Perhaps American success in the Mexican War 
caused it to be v~ewed by future policy makers as a model for forceful 
imposition of policy. 
In any case, the American Civil War caused the United States to re-
strict its military forces to that domestic crisis. France took advan-
tage of this neutralizatipn of United States military power to establish 
a puppet government in Mexico under the Hapsburg Archduke Maximillian. 
The United States protested, but was unable to influence the course of 
events due to its internal problems. When the Civil War was terminated, 
however, the United States became more a,ggressive in its policy and in-
sisted that France leave Mexico. Wh~n France delayed, the United States 
sent arms to Benito Juarei, Maximillian's chief rival. France finally 
abandoned Maximillian and Mexico when it realized that it might be 
forced into a military confrontation with the United States if it con-
tinued to support him.3 
1Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1955), 
p. 35, 
2J, Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States Latin American Relations 
(Boston, 1965), p. 57. 
3John Edwin Fagg, Latin America (New York, 1963), p. 684. 
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As the twentieth century approached, United States policy in the 
Caribbean reach a zenith of aggressiveness, This was probably due to an 
increased martial and expansionist spirit within the United States, the 
excitement generated by the transoceanic canal possibilities, the in-
creased strategic significance given to the Caribbean by Captain Mahan, 
and most importantly, a military force capable of enforcing United States 
policy in the Caribbean. There are several examples of America's muscle 
flexing in this area. The Olney note of 1895 informed Great Britain that 
the United States "is practically sovereign" on this hemisphere and de-
manded that England settle its dispute with Venezuela. 4 In a later 
Venezuelan problem, this time with G~rmany, President Roosevelt actually 
threatened to send naval ships to Venezuela to force a German-Venezuelan 
arbitration concerning a debt dispute. 5 Perhaps the most obvious 19th 
century example of the United States using military force to promote its 
goals is the Spanish-American War. By engaging in a war in which Ameri-
can security was not directly iqvolved, the United States demonstrated 
both a significant interest in Cuba and a willingness to further that 
interest with military force. Engagement in the Spanish-American War 
carried a relatively low level of risk for the United States because of 
the superiority of its military forces. The conflict did not answer the 
question of whether the United States would resort to military involve-
ment in a situation in which the local military superiority was not so 
obvious. 
4Richard Olney, Memo to Thomas F. Bayar~, July 20, 1895, in James 
W. Gantenbien, ed., The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy~ Docu-
mentary Record (New York, 1950), pp":'° 340-354. 
5Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy~ the Caribbean 
1900-1921 (Princeton, 1964), p. 73-.--
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Changing Defense Concepts 
With the arrival of the nuclear age, the United States adopted a 
deterrent policy of massive retaliation. Because this doctrine emphas-
ized nuclear str~ngth, U.S. conventional torces-in-being diminished. At 
the same time, it was questionable wpether or not the United States 
would use its nuclear arsenal to promote its policy in Cuba. Because of 
the weak conventional forces and the credibility question concerning nu-
clear weapons, the United States was not in a favorable military posi-
tion vis-!-vis the Soviet presence in Cuba until 1962. 
The concept of massive retaliation was first conceived in 1947 by 
President Truman's Air Policy Commission, although it was not promulga-
ted as policy until the inconclusive termination of the Korean conflict.6 
It is probable that the unhappy experience of Korea left the United 
States increasingly amenable to a concept that promised noninvolvement 
on alien soil. 
The theory of massive retaliation is deceptively simplistic and 
straightforward. It states that an overwhelming nuclear superiority 
combined with an avowed will to use ,it to protect the vital national in-
terest will deter all enemy aggression. It is a no-nonsense, rigid con-
cept that threatens awesome reprisal for even minor transgressions. Air 
Force General Lemay, arguing before congress, states, "I do not under-
stand why a force that will deter a big war will not deter a small one 
too, n7 General Twinning, also of the Air Force, offers an elabora.tion 
6Eric La~rabee, "The Politics of Strategy," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, March, 1962, p. 18. 
7William F. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964), p. 13. 
of this thinking in relation to Korea. 
In retrospect I have often thought that had we 
dropped one A-bomb on a tactical target during the 
Korean war, thereby advising the Chinese Communists 
to stay on their own side of the border, there 
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might have been no Chinese invasion and no second 
phase to that war, and Korea today might be a united, 
independent country. Furthermore, Dien Bien Phu 
might not have happened, nor would Vietnam have 
been partitioned in 1954,8 
Again, Twinning states, "I have never liked the term (limited war) be-
cause of the thinly veiled weakness and the uncertainty of National in-
terest which it implies."9 
President Eisenhower was heavily influenced by the doctrine of 
massive reprisal although it does appear that he was searching for a 
fl "bl 1· d h d f h" d' ' . lO more exi e po icy towar teen o is a ministration. The trend 
toward a more flexible military force-in-being was reflected by Defense 
Secretary Gates in 1960 by his statement that.the United States need 
prepare itself for both gen~ral and limited war? 11 However, President 
Eisenhower's legacy to President Kennedy was essentially a nuclear force 
structure committed to ~evastating destruction and a limited convention-
al war capability. 
With respect to Cuba, the reliance on nuclear weapons posed two 
associated problems. First, the limited conventional war capability put 
the United States in the position of at times having inadequate forces 
8Nathan F. Twinning, Neither Liberty Nor Safety (New York, 1966), 
p O 117. 
9Ibid, , p. 102, 
lOKaufmann, Strategy, p. 23. 
llu.s. Department of State, "Secretary Gates Answers Questions on 
National Defense," State Department Bulletin, April 11, 1960, p, 557. 
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available to enforce its will in Cuba. For example, it has been re-
ported that Kennedy was reluctant to commit U.S. military forces to the 
Bay of Pigs invasion partly because there would not be sufficient forces 
remaining for a possible contingency elsewhere that might have a higher 
priority than Cuba. 12 Second, the credibility of a nuclear threat was 
doubtful. In short, the United States was ill-prepared to handle re-
actions that required more than diplomatic overtures but less than nu-
clear holocaust. 
Both civilian and military thinkers recognized the shortcomings of 
the massive retaliation doctrine, and attempted reform. Foremost among 
the scholars was Henry Kissinger. As early as 1955, he concluded that a 
stron& nucleqr force would not necessarily deter all levels of aggres-
sion. 
In these circumstances a major or exclusive reliance 
on general war as a deterrent to Sino-Soviet aggres-
sion may come dangerously close to a Maginot mental-
ity - a belief in a strategy which may not be tested 
but which meanwhile prevents the considerations of 
any alternative.13 · 
General Maxwell Taylor, as chief spokesman for the army, resigned his 
post as Army Chief-of-Staff in protest and wrote his worthy indictment 
of the nuclear doctrine,~ Uncertain Trumpet. Of primary concern to 
General Taylor was the need for" ••• increased emphases on our military 
preparation directed at coping with situations short of general war 11 .14 
The protagonists of a more flexible military force did not believe that 
12Kaufmann, Strategy, p. 273. 
13Henry A. Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the Grey 
Areas," Foreign Affairs, April, 1955, p. 47. 
14Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, 1959), p. 62. 
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massive retaliation was a credible deterrent to limited enemy aggression 
or limited American goals. 
The pleas of Kissinger and Taylor, and others, found a sympathetic 
listener in Senator John F. Kennedy. 15 Kennedy was deeply concerned 
with what he considered to be the "Maginot mentality" of United States 
1 . 16 po icy. On the Senate floor in J~ne of 1960, the Senator outlined a 
proposed two point change in American military policy. 
First---We must make invulnerable a nuclear retal-
iatory force second to none. 
Second---We must regain the ability to intervene 
effectively and swift+y in any limited war any-
where in the world .17 · 
Kennedy's inauguration as President of the United States gave him a posi-
tion from which he could implement his concepts. 
Kennedy and McNamara were the init;i.ators of a comprehensive and 
flexible military program which, by the time of the missile crisis of 
1962, had developed into a powerful and reasonably flexible war machine. 
Virtually from the day the Kennedy Administration 
took office in January, 19ol, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara, at the president's request, began the 
search for a coherent and flexible general war 
strategy, which would afford the United States a 
wide range of options between the extreme of 
15The decade from 1955 to 1965 abounded in military strategists. 
The leading group in the earliest years was the Rand Corporation. The 
contributors included A+bert Wohlstetle~, Bernard Brodie, and Herman 
Kahn. For an excellent survey of writings pertaining to this subject 
see Urs Schwarz, American Strategy: ~~ Perspective (Garden City, 
1966). 
16John F. Kennedy, The Missile Gap, in The Strategy of Peace, ed. 
by Allan Nevins (New York, 1960), p. 38. 
17John F. Kennedy,~ New Approach on Foreign Policy A Twelve Point 
Program in ibid., preface. 
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national humiliation and nuclear holocaust.18 
It soon became obvious that Kennedy favored the flexible response doc-
trine as described by Admiral Burke and General Taylor. The President's 
program was to develop an invulnerable second strike nuclear capability 
and to increase non-nuc],ear conventional forces. 19 
Little time was wasted in developing the desired defense posture. 
No sooner had Kennedy taken office when he announced his intention to 
Congress to revitaliz~ the military. By June of 1961, Kennedy was able 
to recommend a reorganization of Army divisions which would increase 
their effective firepower. He further recommended an allocation of 100 
million·dol;I.ars to re-equip the Army, an expansion of the armed forces 
ability to fight non-nuclear and para-military wars, an increase in Army 
Special Forces, an increase in reserve strength, and an increase in Ma-
rine strength to 190,000 men.20 On July 25, 1961, in a report to the 
nation, President Kennedy announced his intentions to increase Army 
strength from 875,000 men to 1,000,000. This was to be complemented by 
an increase in Navy and Air Force strength of 29,000 and 63,000 respec-
tively, and a 1.8 billion dollar increase for non-nuclear weapons. 21 
Again, in October of 1961, Secretary McNamara announced, " ••. we have 
taken measures to strengthen both our nuclear and our non-nuclear 
forces .•. " This included a 100 per cent increase in the Polaris 
18Harland B. Moulton, "The McNamara General War Strategy," Orbis, 
Summer, 1964, p. 238. 
19George E. Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston, l'9f54), p. 228. -----. -
20u.s. Department of State, "Special Message of the President to 
Congress," Sta,te Dep.artment Bulletin, June 12, 1964, pp, 905-908. 
21Ibid., "Report to the Nation by President Kennedy" State Depart-
ment Bulletin, August 14, 1961, p, 269. 
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submarine program, an increase in hardened minute-man missiles, and an 
increase of 50 per cent in bombers on alert. Of even more significance 
was the change in conventional warfare ability, Army divisions were in-
creased in number from 11 to 16. Airlift and sea transport capabilities 
were increased significantly. Finally, counterinsurgency forces were 
tripled. 22 
It was stated that, "An improvement in our capacity for local war 
is therefore indicated not only by considerations of national strategy 
but as our best chance of preserving the peace. 11 23 A major military 
contribution of the Kennedy-McNamara regime was to increase the national 
capacity for alternatives that include local war. The changes made by 
the Kennedy administration in the military force structure were to be a 
significant factor during the 1962 United States-Soviet missile confron-
tation. This avenue will be pursued more fully in Chapter VI. It is 
first necessary, however, to examine the role played by the O.A.S. prior 
to the missile crisis. 
22Kaufmann, Strategy, p. 53. 
23Kissinger, "Military Policy," p. 428. 
CHAPTER V 
THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN 
STATES: REACTIONS TO H~MISPHERIC THREATS 
Thus far, this paper has examined the American reactions to the 
Cuban problem in only a unilateral sense. Washington's view of its na-
tional interest was e~amined to determine the extent of the U.S. commit-
ment in Cuba. The study of the military,role in foreign policy provided 
insight into one means to accomplish U.S. goals, This chapter deals with 
the Organization of American States and the role that organization has 
played pursuant to hemispheric security as viewed by the United States, 
Initial Reactions to Communism 
John Drie~ has defined the three roles of the O.A.S. as protection 
from external threats, solution of inter-hemispheric problems, and 
l "guardianship of the character of American political systems". Its 
first role is of importance in this discussion, The United States, of 
course, has been interested in trying to develop the O.A.S. as an effec-
tive anti-communist bloc. Unfortunately for the United States, member 
states appear to be more interested in their domestic economic and polit-
ical problems. From the point of view of the United States, the O.A.S. 
has shown a rather parochial orientation, and it has been difficult for 
1John c. Drier, The Organization of American States and the Hemi-
sphere Crisis (New York, 1962), p, 73.-- ------~--
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the United States to develop a recognition of external threats within 
the O.A.S. framework. 
Although the concept of Pan Americanism existed in the nineteenth 
century, little progress was made until the twentieth century. The 
first conference was held in Panama in 1826. The United States accepted 
an invitation, but revealed a limited interest by arriving late. 2 The 
conference was a failure as the participating countries did not visual-
ize a clear and present threat to spur cooperation.3 By 1889, the 
United States haddeveloped enough hemispheric interest to host a con-
ference in Washington. This was the start of Pan Americanism and cultur-
al and technical ties developed from this conference. 
The first important conference from the point of view of security 
was held in Buenos Aires in 1936. At this meeting, the countries in-
volved agreed to confer in case of an external threat on a,ny of the mem-
ber countries. Another conference held in Havana in 1940 strengthened 
the concept of mutual security by stating that an attack on.any member 
country would b.e an attack on all. 
A most important conference was held ~t Mexico City in 1945, just 
prior to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at 
San Francisco. The Mexico City conference had two related major goals; 
to strengthen the inter-American system, and to consider the place of a 
regional system in a future world organization. With respect to the 
first goal, the conference agreed to certain transitory decisions known 
as the Act of Chapul tepee which reorganized the;'. inter-American system · 
. . ... . 
2Dexter Perkins;! History .ef.~ Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1955), 
P· 71. 
3William Mayer, Pan Americanism in Crisis (Washington, 1961), p. 21. 
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and provided for mutual defense, With respect to the second goal, the 
O.A.S. sent documents to the San Francisco conference containing "views, 
comments and suggestions" concerning the role of regional defense alli-
ances in the proposed United Nations system. The Act of Chapultepec was 
ultimately instrumental in the adoption of United Nations Charter Arti-
cle 51, which recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defense. 4 
The present O.A.S. security system is prescribed by two conferences 
which translated the provisions of the Mexico City Conference of 1945 
into more permanent terms. The first conference occurred in 1947 at Rio 
de Janeiro. The so called Rio Pact that emerged f:r-om this meeting had 
two major points, First, an armed attack on any signatory called for 
immediate assistance, the type and amount of assistance to be determined 
by the assisting country, Second, aggression short of an armed attack 
required consultation among the member nations to determine appropriate 
actions. In 1948, at Bogata, the O.A.S. established the O.A.S, charter 
and the treaty of Pacific Settlement. The charter also provided for the 
competence of the various organs of the O.A.S, 5 
4Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, The Inter-
American System (Dobbs Ferry, 1966), pp, xxx, xxxi. 
5charter of the American States, found in ibid,, pp. 331-348. 
Throughout the-:rext""of this thesis, several terms will be used. "The 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs" is held to con-
sider problems of "an urgent nature and of common interest to the Ameri-
can States, and to serve as the Organ of Consultation." "The Council" 
is the permanent composition of the O.A.S. consisting of representatives 
"especially appointed by the respective government ••. " The Council may 
serve provisionally as the Organ of Consultation. "The Organ of Consul-
tation" is defined in the Rio Pact as the organ that decides what col-
lective action is to be taken in case of attack on a member nation. 
(Seep, 377 of ibid.) 
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An appropriate question is, has the O.A.S. effectively opposed what 
the United States considers to be communist-oriented regimes in the West-
ern Hemisphere? For the pre-Castro era, the answer must be answered in 
the negative. The Rio Treaty was cited eight times from its inception 
to 1960. 6 However, the 1954 Guatemala situation provides the only pre-
Castro example of O.A.S. involvement concerning a possible external 
threat. 
In 1954, the O.A.S. convened at Caracas to discuss "communist 
threats to the hemisphere", with the Guatemalan problem being of prime 
concern. As was previou~ly shown, tne ~.s. position was to obtain a 
strong statement coridemn.i,ng communism. The Latin American representa-
tives generally disagreed with the U.S. view of the communist threat. 7 
American concern was security; Latin American concern was sovereignty. 
The Latin Americans were also distracted by domesti.c, economic, and 
political problems. 8 The final Declaration of Caracas read in part: 
That the dominance of any political institution of 
any American State by the international communist 










Pan Americanism, p. 49. The eight 
°"'I948 - Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua 
1950 - Caribbean dispute 
1954 - Guatemalen crisis 
1955 - Costa Rica vs. Nicaragua 
1957 - Honduras vs. Nicaragua 
1959 - Panama dispute 
1959 - Nicaragua 
1960 - Venezuelan problem 
times were: 
7Robert J, Alexander, Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick, 
1957), p. 376. 
8Edwin Lieuwen, United States Policy in Latin America (New York, 
1965), p. 84. 
system of an extra-continental power, would consti-
tute a threat to the social and political indepen-
dence of the American States, endangering the peace 
of America, and would call for a meeting of consul-
tation to consider the adoption of measures in ac-
cordance with existing treaties.9 
The declaration was not as strong as the United States had hoped for, 
and did little other than restate provisions already enumerated in the 
Rio Treaty. 
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The Guatemalan problem continued to exist, and as President Arbenz' 
control became more tenuous he petitioned the O.A.S. Peace Committee, an 
advisory organization of the O.A.S., to investigate possible intervention 
by Honduras and Nicaragua. The situation was thrown into a state of con-
fusion when Arbenz then sent the same petition to the U.N. Security 
Council, where he could hope for a benign attitude on behalf of the 
Soviet Union. The next day Arbenz asked the O.A.S. Peace Committee to 
disregard his request in deference to possible action by the United Na-
tions. A United States-Soviet Union confrontation developed in the 
United Nations Security Council as to whether the United Nations or the 
O.A.S. should consider the problem. When the U.N. finally deferred from 
judging the case, Arbenz agreed to let the 0,A.S. have jurisdiction, 
However, he was overthrown before the O.A.S. committee arrived. 10 It is 
probably that the O.A.S. would not have taken a strong anti-communist 
stand since the Latin American countries were so critical of the sus-
pected American involvement in the overthrow of Arbenz. The United 
9council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Re-
lations, 1954 (Washington, 1955), p. 413. 
10 
J, Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Security, 
1889-1960 (Austin, 1961)~97. 
11rbid. , 451. 
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States was on the defensive until it offereq documents purporting to 
. . 11 prove communist involvement. 
Because of circumstances, then, the O.A.S. did not prove to be an 
effective aid to the United States in the Guatemalan situation. Based 
on the attitudes and beliefs of the Latin American countries, it is 
doubtful that the organizatiop would have given strong support in any 
but the most threatening conditions. 
It is concluded by this writer that in the pre-Castro era, the 
O.A.S. was not strongly anti-communistic and did not visualize the Soviet 
Union as a significant threat to the hemisphere. There was a depreca-
tion of affairs external to the hemisphere. For example, at the Rio con-
ference the Latin American countries refused to extend the Rio Pact to 
U.S. overseas possessions. Also, they provided no military support in 
Korea. 12 There was a constant clash between the American desire for 
hemispheric security and the Latin American fear of intervention, a fear> 
brought on by the high handed actions used by the United States earlier 
in this century. Communism was not as significant a problem as that of 
rising expectations and the resulting domestic disequilibriums. To the 
extent that the O.A.S. was anti-communistic, it was more to please the 
United States than because of any sincere convictions. As the Cuban 
situation developed, the Soviet Union had less to fear from the O.A.S. 
than from any unilateral actions that the United States might take. 
12Jerome Slater, A Reevaluation of Collective Security (Columbus, 
1965), p, 24. 
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The Organization of American States 
and the Cuban Problem 
Prior to the missile crisis, the Untted States was involved with a 
continuous and, on the whole, unsuccessful attempt to develop the Organ-
ization of American States as an effective anti-Communist organization. 
The Organization would not, or could not, act strongly and directly 
against either the Castro regime or the Sino-$oviet ties with that 
regime. The O.A.S., however, dealt with several problems associated 
with Cuba in the early 1960s. 
During April of 1959, Panama complained to the O.A.S. that an alien 
force had invaded its territory and req1,1ested 0,A.S. action. Subsequent 
investigation revealed that the invasion had taken place, it had origi-
nated in Cuba, and the invaders were almost exclusively Cubans. 13 Des-
pite the evidence, the O.A,S. Organ of Consultation chose to make no 
14 complaint against the Cuban government. 
Three very important conferences occurred in the first three years 
of the 1960s. The first was at San Jos~, Costa Rica in 1960 and the 
second and third were held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, All three were 
concerned, at least in part, with the Cuban problem. At all three, the 
O.A.S. took action less forceful than advocated by the United States. 
' . The San Jose Conference, the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of 
Foreign Ministers, was convoked at the request of Peru to discuss the 
13Inter-American Institute of International Legal Studies, Inter-
American System, p, 154. 
14u.s. Department of State, Inter-American Efforts to Relieve Inter-
national Tension in the Western Hemisphere 1959-1960, Inter-American 
Series No. 79 (Washington, 1961), p. 9. 
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inadmissability of extracontinental intervention within the hemisphere 
and the development of means to prevent such intervention. In a note 
supporting the convocation, the United State$ named the Soviet Union as 
the primary instigator of such intervention. The United States was hop-
ing for a strong declaration renouncing Castro and the Soviet Union. 15 
At the meeting, however, the reaction of the Latin American coun-
tries was mixed. Mexico, in rejecting a strong anti-Cuban declaration, 
admonished that, "Collective action co1+ld endanger the principle of non-
intervention unless it was limited to use where pea.ce and security were 
clearly threatened." Venezuela was critical of the U.S. for an "un-
16 
reasonable attitude" toward Cuba. 
I 
The Declaration of San Jose was a compromise resolution that con~ 
demned.extra-hemispheric intervention as contrary to the spirit of the 
Rio Pact and the Bogota Charter, and which criticized the Soviet attempts 
to exploit hemispheric social and political conditions. However, Cuba 
was not specifically mentioned. Reaction to the declaration was mixed. 
Secretary Herter concluded that the declaration constituted a "clear 
indictment of the Castro government". The Mexican representative, on 
the other hand, disagreed and stated that the declaration did not: 
••• constitute a condemnation or a threat against 
Cuba, where aspirations for economic improvement 
and social justice have the strongest sympathy of 
the government and people of Mexico. 
15Ibid., "American Foreign Ministers Condemn Sino-Soviet Interven-
tion in American States," by Christian Herter, State Department Bulletin, 
June 12, 1961, pp. 395-407. 
16Ibid., Inter-American Efforts, p. 73. 
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Similarly, seven other countries expressed sympathy with Cuba. 17 
The first Punta del Este Conference was ostensibly held to inaugu-
rate Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. However the U.S. representative, 
Delessops Morrison, writes that the delegation was quietly attempting to 
gain support for a proposal of sanctions against Cuba due to that is-
land's Soviet affiliations. 18 The attempt failed when Ernesto "Che" 
Guevara, Cuba's envoy, was able to severely embarrass the American govern-
ment by releasing a document allegedly captured from the portfolio of an 
American official. That document crudely condemned the incumbent 
19 Venezuelan government as inept and corrupt. Although the United 
States denied the validity of the document, Cuba had unquestionably 
scored a stunning propaganda victory and Latin America was in no mood to 
consider any anti-Castro actions. 
By the end of 1961, several Latin American countries were ready to 
take action to weaken the Cuban-Soviet ties. Peru cited the Rio Treaty 
and accused the Cuban government of estabJ_ishing a:q oppressive dictator-'-
ship, incorpor~ting Cuba into the Sino-Soviet bloc, and infiltrating and 
subverting other Latin American countries. Based on these accusations, 
Peru requested an emergency meeting of the Organ of Consultation. This 
request was contested by a South American bloc consisting of Mexico, 
Uruguay, and Brazil. Action on the request was delayed due to a general 
recognition by the O.A.S. countries that to force the issue would lead 
17George Wythe, The United States and Inter-American Relations 
(Gainsville, 1964), p~6. 
18Delessops S. Morrison, Latin American Mission, ed. by Gerald 
Frank (New York, 1965), p. 87, 
19Ibid., p. 89. 
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to a perhaps irreparable.schism. 2° Finally, a month after the Peruvian 
request, the Colombian delegation demanded that the original request be 
acted on. At that time, seven countries were reluctant to approve the 
convention. Colombia and. Peru insisted on a roll call, and after a dra-
matic last minute change of vote by the Uruguayan delegate, the convoca-
tion of a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was 
approved with the minimum votes necessary.21 
At the second Punta del Este meeting, the United States delegation 
included four influential Senators and Secretary of State Rusk. The in-
tention of the United States delegation was to ask for full sanctions 
against Cuba, the most severe measure short of armed conflict that the 
Organization of American States could inflict. The American delegate, 
Delessops Morrison, had calculated probable results to be fourteen af-
firmative and seven abstentions or negative votes. 22 A two-thirds ap-
proval is required for passage. These calculations were upset when 
Haiti, a supposed supporter, declared an intention to abstain. That 
same evening, the United States of{ered to build a new airport in Haiti 
and that erstwhile country then became a firm supporter of anti-Cuban 
sanctions. 23 In an apparent attempt to secure more general support, the 
United States tempered its proposal and suggested ouster of Cuba from 
the Organization of American States system rather than sanctions. 
20Hispanic American Report, October, 1961, p. 942. 
21The final vote was 14 yes and six abstentions. The Uruguayan 
delegate had disobeyed his instructions by voting in the affirmative. 
He immediately resigned his position. See Morrison, Mission, p, 157. 
22M O M' ' 173 orr1son, 1ss1on, p. • 
23Ibid., p. 192. 
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The American delegation was probably wise to offer the compromise 
resolution since it passed with on~y the minimum fourteen affirmative 
votes. The final Declaration of Punta del Este had three major resolu-
tions. First was the decision to exclude Cuba from the Inter-American 
system. However, this resolution was not approved by Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Bolivia,Chile, Ecuador• or Cuba. Together these countries 
comprise better than 70 per cent of the population of Latin America. 
Secretary Rusk noted that only Cuba actually voted against this resolu-
tion and called it a clear cut renunciation of the Cuban-Soviet Alli-
ance.24 The abstention of six South.Ameri~an·cou~tries, however, indi-
cates questionable hemispheric solidarity. 
'i: 
A second resolution·excluded Cuba from the Inter-American Defense 
Board. Although this resolution passed unanimously, it was merely re-
cording a fait accompli. Cuba had been excluded from secret meetings of 
the Board since April of 1961. 
The third major resolution of the Punta Del Este meeting establish-
ed an armed embargo of Cuba by the signatory nations. Despite the fact 
that this embargo was already in effect, four countries abstained. 
In retrospect, this writer does not consider the second Punta del 
Este meeting an unqualified succes for .the U.S. efforts. The resolu-
tions were diluted, and in many cases, a mere recognition of an existing 
situation. 
The O.A.S. convened once again prior to the missile crisis. In 
September of 1962, Secretary Rusk :r'equested an informal meeting of the 
24u.s. Department of State, "Report to the Nation on the Punta del 
Este Conference," by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, February 
19, 1962, p. 269. . 
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Council of the O.A.S. to discuss areas of general interest, The O,A,S. 
members seemed willing to meet and did so on October 2 and 3 in Wash-
ington. 
The conference reasserted the O.A.S. intention to preserve hemi-
spheric integrity: 
, , , in accordance with th.t;a ppinciples of the regional 
system, staunchly sustaining and consolidating the 
principles of Charter of the Organization of the Amer-
ican States and affirmed the will to strengthen the 
security of the hemisphere against all aggression 
from within or outside the hemisphere and against 
acts developments or situations capable of threaten-
ing the peace and security of the hemisphere through 
the application of the inter-American treaty of Re-
cip~ical Assistance of Rio de Janeiro.25 
Since the meeting was informal, no speci;fic resolution was passed. The 
general proclamatio~ was not cont~sted. Secretary Rusk, however, was 
reportedly h9ping for a stronger statement,26 
Although themeeting accompliehed little other than reiteration of 
prior agreements, the willingness with which the ministers adopted the 
statement probably encouraged the United States in its relations with 
the Soviet Union, and allowed increased flexibility in the oncoming mis-
sile crisis. 27 However, overall O~A.S. reaction to the influence of the 
Soviet Union in Cuba prior to the missile crisis was not as strong as 
the United States desired. 
Three major problem areas are discernible in:analyzing the O.A.S. 
2511The O.A.S. Resolution on Cuba," Current History, February, 1963, 
p. 111. 
26Paul S. Hilbo, "Cold War Drift in Latin America," Current History, 
Februaryt 1963, p. 72. 
27Ann VanWynen Thomae and A. J, Thomas, Jri, .The Organization of 
American States (Dailas, 1963), p. 329. 
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reluctance to react positively against Castro or Soviet involvement with 
Cuba. In the first place, the problem was complex from a legal and 
organizational point of view. Mexico was the chief protagonist of the 
legalistic argument. In the viewpoint of that government, the O.A.S. 
was incompetent to act due to its avowed principle of nonintervention. 
Mexico did not visualize the Cuban problem as a direct and immediate 
threat to hemispher.ic security; therefore, action was impossible. John 
Drier, a longtime American representative to the O.A.S., has described 
the organizational problems associated with action by the hemispheric 
organization. A Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of foreign Affairs 
is not competent to direct specific measures against a country unless it 
has been convoked as Organ of Consultation under the provisions of the 
Rio Treaty. Citation of the Rio Treaty requires proof of imminent 
danger. 28 The examples of the attempts of Peru and Colombia in 1961 to 
invoke the Rio Treaty demonstrates the tremendous resistance that need 
be overcome to obtain action. However, if general agreement exists 
among the delegates, the organizational problem can be solved. The prob-
lem appears to be resistance by the specific governments to action rather 
than any inherent.awkwardness of the organization.29 
A second group of problems concerns a distrust by the Latin Ameri-
can nations of U.S. intentions. The memory of intervention by the "Col-
lossus of the North" was still very keen. The nonintervention principle 
was a major cause of Latin American reluctance to condemn Cuba at the 
28John C. Drier, "The O.A.S. and the Cuban Crisis," SAIS Review, 
February, 1961, pp. 4-6. 
29Ibid., p. 8. 
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Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in 196o.30 Simi-
larly, a reluctance to implement an interventionist principle was a pri-
mary cause of the recalcitrance of the Latin American countries at the 
Second Purlta del Este Conference. 31 Fear of communism exists, but it is 
not as strong as fear of imperialism. 
A final problem area hindering O.A.S. action was underlying approv-
al of Castro. Initially, many Latin Americans applauded Castro's revo-
lution. It was in the liberal tradition of Mexico and Boliva. In addi-
tion, Brazil saw Cuba as a potential hostage to keep the United States 
on good behavi~r.32 Virtually all of the South American countries, and 
particularly Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Uruguay had a large number 
of Fidelistas that were too powerful to be ignored or aggravated. It 
would not be good politics for these countries to condemn Cuba. 
For several reasons, then, the O.A.S. was not as effective a brake! 
on the Soviet..;;;Cuban a:lliallce as the Uriit:ed States desired. The Organi-
zation of.American States was unable to take any effective actions until 
January 1962, at Punta de! Este. Even then, the action was diluted, in-
conclusive, and heavily opposed. The United States learned t.hat this 
alliance was. of limited use in dealing with the problem of Soviet influ-
ence in Cuba. 
30wythe, Relations, p. so. 
31Robert N. Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere (Washington, 1967), p. 28. 
32wythe, Relations, p. 49. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: A CASE STUDY 
The Conflict of National Interest 
The events of October 1962, brought the cold war into sharp and 
dramatic focus •. The transition was from a relatively stable level of 
. sparring to a direct and highly volatile confrontation b.etween the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The Latin .American countries, including 
Cuba, did not play dynamic roles. It was essentially a face-to-face 
power confrontation betw~eh the two giants in a realpolitik sense. 1 
Pachter has classified the conflict as art ''instance of a law that gov-
erns the power relations of the cold war ••• ,,2 
The first indication of the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuban 
soil occurred. in the Unit.ed Nations on October 8. Cuban President,· 
' ' . 
Osvalclo .Dorticos' proclaimed tha.t Cuba had II inevitable weapons which we 
would have preferred not to acquire and which we do not wish to em-
ploy. 11 3 On October 14, an American U-2 plane took photographs of mis-
sile sites in the San Cristobal area of Cuba. These were shown to 
President Kennedy on the morning of October 16. From that time, until 
1Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course the Cuban Missile Crisis and 
Coexistence (New York, 1963), p. 134. 
2Ibid., p. 99. 




the proclamation to the nation on October 22, Kennedy met with his ad-
visors reper.itedlr .to search for alternative responses. Fortunately, the 
build-up had been discovered with sufficient time to allow for some 
rational ~a:lculations. 4 · 
Six b?'oad solutions to the threat would appear to have existed,5 
To begin with, the situation could have been ignored on the assumption 
that the nuclear missiles inCuba did not drastically change the balance 
of power, and was not therefore worth the risk involved in attempting 
any forceful measures, A second alternative was to protest to the U,N, 
and the O.A.S, and hope to obtain action through lengthy negotiations. 
A third possibility was to propose a clandestine ultimatum to Castro, 
hoping to frighten him into a unilateral rejection of Soviet missile aid. 
A fourth consideration was a blockade. The fifth possibility was a 
surgical air strike aimed specifically at the missile sites. The final 
alternative was to launch a full fledged invasion against Cuba. Of the 
foregoing, only alternatives four and five were considered at length. 
There were three major objections to the fifth alternative, a surgi-
cal air strike: one, it was risky in terms of retaliation since Soviet 
personnel would be involved; two, it would be a difficult military prob-
lem because of limited reconnaissance; and three, there was a moral re-
jection of a "Pearl Harbor" type of invasion.6 The blockade, or quaran-
tine as it was to be called, had the advantages of lower risk and higher 
flexibility. It could be augmented by further unilateral or 
4Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, 1967), p. 191. --- . 
·5Theodore c. Soreilsep, Kennedy (New YoI'k, 1965), p. 682. 
6Hilsman, .·~ Move ~ Nation, p. 203, 
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multilateral action if necessary. Kennedy chose this alternative while 
expressing a willingness to resort to. other more stringent measures. 7 
The action was termed a quarantin~ rather than a blockade to further 
limit the reaction and to avoid an.act of war, which a blockade would 
have been. 8 
·After six tension filled days, the immediate crisis was resolved. 
The Soviet Union sent two conflicting messages. One, received by Wash-
ington on October 26, apparently accepted the U.S. proposal to halt the 
missile build-up and to remove those already received by Cuba as well as 
the IL-28 Soviet bombers to which the U.S. also objected. In return, 
the United States would end the quarantine and give assurances against 
an invasion of Cuba. 9 Before President Kennedy could construct a reply 
to this satisfactory proposal, he received another communique from the 
Kremlin. This message involved a quid-pro-quo, the withdrawal of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba for U~S. withdrawal·of missiles in Turkey in return. 10 
Although the American missiles in Turkey were obsolete and their dis-
mantling already planned, Kennedy was reluctant to weaken his stand on 
Cuba by accepting the Soviet propos&l. Robert Kennedy repoI'tedly pI'o-
posed a diplomatic move by which the president would simply ignoI'e the 
second note and I'espond in the affiI'mative to the fiI'st. This move 
7u.s. Department of State, The United States Response to Soviet 
Military Build-up in Cuba, Inter-American Series No. 80 (Washington, 
1962) •. · . 
8Eustace Seligmat1, "The Legality of the United States QuaI'antine 
Action Under the United Nations ChaI'teI', 0 American Bar Association 
JOUI'-nal, February, 1963~ pp~ 142-145. 
9Mezerik, Cuba, p. 30. 
lODavid L. LaI'son, The Cuban Crisis of 1962 Selected Documents and 
Chronology (Boston, 1962"'>:-p. 159. ---~~ 
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succeeded, and the crisis abated. However, Castro never allowed on-site 
inspection, and President Kennedy never made a formal no-invasion pledge. 
ABC newsman John Scali played a significant role as informal inter-
mediary between the Soviet government and the U.S. State Department. On 
Friday, October 26, Scali met with Aleksandr Fomin, Counselor to the 
Soviet Embassy in Washington, at Fomin's request. The Russian asked 
· Scali how the United States would react to a Soviet proposal of disman-
tling of the missile bases in Cuba in exchange for a U.S. no-invasion 
pledge. Scali consulted with Secretary of State Dean Rusk who secured 
the President's approval of the proposal and instructed Scali to convey 
that message to Fomin. Scali did so and the first Soviet message which 
closely approximated the Fomin proposal arrived later that evening. When 
the second Soviet message arrived, demanding the removal of American 
missiles from Turkey, Scali contacted Fomin and expressed displeasure at 
the second proposal. The next morning, the Soviet Union replied favor-
ably to the formula as first proposed by Fomin. 11 
President Kennedy's handling of the crisis drew general acclaim, 
although there were dissenters who thought the American response to be 
too strong and immoralj or at the other extreme, that the United States 
should have launched a full-fledged invasion to rid the hemisphere of 
12 the Castro menace. To a large degree, Kennedy's response was con-
sistent with both traditional American interests in the Caribbean, and 
11Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garqen City, 1966), pp. 274-279. 
12Generally, leftist elements supported a moderate strategy. Two 
articulate protagonists of this idea were Norman Thomas and William T, 
Williams. Conservative elements demanded a tough big-stick policy. 
Chief advocates include Senator Keating and various military elements. 
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on his own firm opposition to offensive missiles in Cuba. There could 
be little misunderstanding of Kennedy's intentions underlying his state-
ment of September 13, 1962. 
If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were 
to endanger or interfere with '.OUl' security in any way, 
including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the 
Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at 
Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in 
this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export 
its aggr~ssive.purposes by force or the threat of 
force against any nation in the hemisphere, or be-
come an offensive military base of significant capac-
ity for the Soviet Union then this country will do 
whatever.must be d~~e to protect its own security 
and of its allies. 
Despite this and other warnings, the Soviet Union had chosen to place 
missiles in Cuba •. 
There were two reasons for the strength of Kennedy's reaction.14 
The first was that he had, in fact, committed himself by his address of 
September 13. Also, the suddenness by which the international balance 
was threatened bothered the President. In any case, the assessed na-
tional interest of the United States was certainly a very strong factor 
in this power struggle. That the United States came out as well as it 
did in this crisis is due in no small part to the speed and intensity of 
its reaction. This reaction was motivated by an overwhelming concern 
for national security. 
Given the demonstrated intensity of American involvement, why did 
the Soviets choose to place missiles in Cuba? Leon Lipson had offered 
13u.s. Department of State, "President States U.S. Policy Toward 
Cuba," State Department Bulletin, October 1, 1962, p. 481. 
14Hilsman, · To Move ~ Nation, p. 202. 
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five major reasons for the Soviet action. 15 Other authors amplify these 
positions. 
First, it is theorized that Cuba requested the missiles ostensibly 
to defend itself from its aggressive northern neighbors. Khrushchev be-
came a willing partner to Castro's power play as Cuba would then serve 
as a case study of how the Soviet Union can develop a small nation into 
a nuclear power capable of threatening the United States. 16 A second 
and associated rationale was that installment of Russian missiles would 
serve to drive .Castro further into the arms of the Soviet Union by 
creating a military dependency. 
The third reason is that Khrushchev hoped to obtain a diplomatic 
victory by installing the missiles and presenting the United States with 
a fait accomplL This would be another d~feat to the already weakened 
image of President. Kennedy. Khrushchev thought little of Kennedy's 
willingness to use forceful measures dtieto his lack of forcefulness 
during the Bay of Pigs episode,17 and reportedly told Robert Frost that 
Americans were too liberal to fight. 18 This anticipated defeat for 
Kennedy would of course be a victory for Khrushchev by illustrating 
Soviet power to the other Latin American countries. 
The fourth purpose of Soviet ins.tallation of Soviet missiles in 
Cuba was to obtain a bartering point for possible concessions in Berlin 
15Leon Lipsit, "Castro and the Cold War," Cuba and the United 
States, ed. by John Plank (Washington, 1967), pp. 191-19~ 
16Theodore Draper, "Castro and Communism," Reporter, January 17, 
1963, pp. 38-40. 
17Robert D. Crane, "A Strategic Analysis of American and Soviet 
Policy," Orbis, April, 1963, p. 532. 
18Ibid., p. 531. 
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and other crisis areas of the world. 
A final suggestion offered to explain Soviet missile aid to Cuba is 
related to the deficiency in the number of Soviet missiles vis-a-vis the 
United States. Despite Kennedy's concern with the missile gap in the 
1960 election campaign, better intelligence indicated that the opposite 
was true.· The Soviets had a definite deficiency in strategic missiles. 
Further, the Kennedy-McNamara increase in military expenditures had 
widened the gap.· However, the Soviets had a very real superiority in 
intermediate range and medium range ballistic missiles, 19 In Cuba, 
.these missiles would be just as effective as long range ballistic mis-
siles. They had the further advantage of striking from the southern 
coast of the United States, thus forcing a reorientation of U.S. de-
fenses. 
Of the five explanations outlined above, only the last is of stra-
tegic importance to the Soviet Union; the other four are largely of tac-
tical significance. Furthermore, the value of Soviet missiles in Cuba 
as an·instant solution to the missile gap is also questionable. The 
United States was capable of realigning its defenses to counter the new 
threat. Thus, at best, the Soviet move was only a temporary solution to 
the missile gap. Correspondingly, the United States considered its vital 
national interests to be involved. In short, both sides had a high risk 
involvement and commensurate iqterests at stake. 
National interests alone, however, are not enough to win a confron-
tation. National interests only provide the will to win, It is also 
necessary to have the means to both bargain and threaten force, The 
19Roger Hogan and Bert Bernstein, "Military Value of Missiles in 
Cuba," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March, 1963, p. 13, 
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United States was in a favorable position with superior and balanced 
military forces, a geographic proximity to Cuba, and an alliance that 
finally showed a degree of solidarity. 
The Military: A Tool of Diplomacy 
As a result of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, what has been 
called the largest invasion force since WorldWar Il was assembled in 
the southeastern portion of the United States. 20 The military front that 
the United States presented the U.S.S.R. was massive, diverse, and capa-
ble of carrying out various purposes. Reports conflict as to the exact 
disposition of forces. What does emerge, though, is definite American 
superiority both in nuclear forces and in conventional strength within, 
reasonable proximity of Cuba. 
The following data compares the nuclear capabilities of the United 
States with that of the Communist Bloc at that time. It also shows how 
a military alliance with the N.A.T.O. countries could change the overall 
balance if the conflict assumed even broader international proportion.21 
Communist Western 
U.S. Bloc World 
Intercontinental Range 
Ballistic Missiles 400 75+ 400 
Medium Range Ballistic Missiles 200 700 250 
Strategic Bombers 1600 1600 2400 
Polaris type missiles 144 Unknown 144 
20sorensen, Kennedy, p. 714. 
21The chart is a composite from three sources. 
a. Pachter, Collision Course, p. 56. 
b. Crane, "Strategic Analysis," p. 537. 
c. Hogan and Bernstein, 11 Missiles in Cuba," p, 11. 
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Although the United States had an overwhelming lead in intercontinental 
nuclear weapon delivery systems, the Soviet Union had a large superior-
ity in missiles with up to 2,000 miles range. A medium range missle in 
Cuba could cover the southern portion of the United States where most of 
the long-range bomber bases are located, thus it has the utility of an 
intercontinental range missle if properly dispersed. 22 
It has been estimated that close to fifty Soviet missiles would be 
operational in Cuba by the end of October.23 This is what caused Presi-
dent Kennedy to be disturbed at the sudden shift in the nuclear balance 
of power. 
The United States preferred to keep the confrontation below the 
level of nuclear challenge. It therefore mobilized a strong and highly 
versatile conventional force capable of carrying on local warfare in 
Cuba with or without nuclear weapons •. Eight army divisions, or lOOiOOO 
men were deployed to the southeastE;irn part.of the United States. Another 
10 to 20 thousand were on standby reserve. 24 In addition, 300,000 re-
serves were alerted and the Naval base at Quantanamo was strengthened by 
two Marine Battalions. It has been estimated that Florida alone harbored 
1,000 military aircraft and 90 ships during the crisis. 25 
Cuba also possessed a significant military force. By this time it 
had developed a very reputable army, consisting of approximately 100,000 
22 Hogan and Bernstein, "Missiles in Cuba," p. 12. 
23nexter Perkins, The u.s~ and~ Caribbean (Cambridge, 1966), 
p. 147. 
24William F. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1965), 
p. 271 
25Pachter, Collision Course, p. 56. 
well-trained men. There was also a well-trained militia capable of 
rapid mobilization, and 30,000 Soviet Troops. 26 
The air arm consisted of more than 100 planes supported by anti-
aircraft guns and missiles. The Cuban naval force, however, was quite 
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small, Although the Cuban ground force was equal in number to the Ameri-
can armed forces immediately available for deployment to Cuba, the United 
States maintained conventional superiority in naval and air power, in 
refined weaponry, and in a virtually limitless reserve force. 
During the crisis, the American nuclear force neutralized the Soviet 
nuclear force, and served as a shield under which the conventional 
forces could act. Since Kennedy never did state the exact nature of his 
military challenge, he was free to choose from a myriad of alternatives. 
His first problem was how to react to the crisis. Because of U.S. mili-
tary strength, he could choose from among options ranging from a nuclear 
showdown to a conventional invasion of Cuba.to a limited naval quaran-
tine. Even after he chose the latter, he was reasonably free to esca-
late as necessary to accomplish his objectives. 
A conventional force is a convenient tool for buying time. For 
example, during the crisis a U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over 
Cuba. Kennedy's initial reaction was to respond to this development by 
attacking one surface to air missile site. However, since settlement 
seemed so close, it was deemed overly dangerous to chance a very possi-
ble escalation by the u.s.s.R. A plan was decided upon instead to use 
fighter escorts for future reconnaissance flights. In addition, more 
26Hanson W. Baldwin, "A Military Perspective," in Cuba and the 
United States, ed. by John Plank (Washington, 1967), pp~l~S-.--
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low-level, high speed planes would be·used.27 
Since the United States had the conventional forces necessary to 
invade Cuba and remove the missile sites without using nuclear weapons, 
the decision to resort to a nuclear holocaust would have to be made by 
h S . t" u. 28 t e ovie nion. This was highly unlikely due to American nuclear 
superiority and the relatively low priority given to Cuba by the Kremlin. 
The American position might have lacked credibility without the conven-
tional forces, and therefore the crisis coiild have been even more por-
tentous. It is questionable if the Soviet Union would have believed a 
threatened nuclear first-strike by theUnited States as an ultimation to 
Soviet removal of missiles in Cuba. Sorensen has expressed doubt that 
the United States could have been effective during the crisis had not 
the 1961-1962 military build-up occurred in both nuclear and convention-
al forces.2 9 The U.S. nuclear forbe \<las sufficient·to deter a·Soviet 
nuclear attack, but could not in itself enforce a solution to the 
crisis. 30 It has been estimated that: ,, ••• of all the lessons of Cuba 
the ones of greatest significance was the realization by Washington pol-
icymakers of the unique utility of conventional forces. 1131 
Kennedy's management of U.S. military power demonstrated remarkable 
coolness and adeptness. He avoided the extremists who advocated appease-
mentor a nuclear challenge in favor of a limited but effective naval 
27Pachter, Collision Course, p. 54. 
28crane, "Strategic Analysis," p. 547. 
29sorensen, Kennedy, p. 714. 
30walter Lippman, "Cuba and the Nuclear Risk," Atlantic, February, 
1963, p. 56. 
31Georg~·E. Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston, 1964), p. 254. 
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quarantine. At the same time, he did not eliminate the use of more 
forceful measures to accomplish his purposes, After the crisis, General 
Wheeler of the Army and General Lemay of the Air Force each proclaimed 
a singular victory for his particular service in the Cuban crisis. It 
would appear that both nuclear and conventional forces contributed to 
the U.S. position. 
The knowledge that he (Kennedy) commanded large non-
nuclear as well as nuclear resources certainly facili-
tated action by the President. Unlike the situation 
in early 1961, he could cope with the threat in Cuba 
and still dispose of reserves for contingencies else-
where,$2 
The Role of the Organization of American States 
A major utility of the O.A.S. in the Cuban problem was a legitimiz-
ing function for the quarantine. Kennedy was concerned about the legal 
problems of the action and had Assistant Attorney General Katzenbach 
research the question. Katzenbach reported that the quarantine would 
have a foundation in international law if the action were multilateral, 
The editor of the American Journal of International Law stated that this 
quarantine was legal because it was multilateral, it considered interna-
tional agreements, it was a limited response, and it had general Latin 
American approvai. 33 With respect to the legal problem, Kennedy's proc-
lamation of October 22 stated only his intent to establish a quarantine, 
It was not actually implemented until October 24, after the O.A.S. had 
32Kaufmann, McNamara, p. 273. 
33carey Olivier, IIInternational Law and the Quarantine of Cuba," 
American Journal of International Law, p. 376. 
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approved the measure,34 
The United States also considered that it needed the O.A.S. for 
moral rationalization. Sorensen suggests that tremendous confusion 
would have resulted if the O.A.S. had not chosen to back the U.S. posi-
tion.35 Similarly, Secretary Rusk in a post-evaluation of the O.A.S. 
role in the crisis noted: "Had there been disunity, and had we fallen 
to quarreling among ourselves, I think the results might have been quite 
different. 1136 
On October 23, Secretary Rusk presented two resolutions to the 
37 O.A.S. The first was a procedural request for convocation of the Organ 
of Consultation under the Inter-Americ'3.n Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
The second resolution called for immediate dismantling and withdrawal of 
all offensive weapons from Cuba andriecommended that the member nations 
of the O.A.S. take measures necessary to insure that the build-up was 
halted. The United States strongly desired unanimity on this resolution 
and was careful to indicate that the action of any Latin American nation 
would be strictly on a unilateral basis. 
The O.A.S. recognized the urgency of Rusk's request and passed a 
strong declaration that same day. The first two resolutions were passed 
exactly as requested by the United States; the O.A.S. called for 
34Hilsman, Nation, p. 213. 
35Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision Making in the White House (New 
York, 1963), p. 24. 
36u.s. Department of State, "Changing Patterns in World Affairs," 
Press Conference by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, December 
17, 1962, p. 911. 
37Dean Rusk, "Statement by Secretary Rusk to O.A.S., October 23, 
1962" The Cuban Crisis of 1962 Selected Documents and Chronology, ed. by 
David L.Larson (Boston-;-1963), P• 62. 
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immediate dismantling of missiles and other offensive weapons, and it 
was recommended that member nations take all measures necessary, includ-
ing armed force, to ensure that Cuba no longer received offensive weap-
ons. Further resolutions stated that the·Organ·of Consultation would re-
main convened to observe the situation and to report to the United 
Nations. 38 
In light of the fact that the resolutions·werepassed unanimously 
as requested, the October 23 meeting of the O;A;S, was a significant· 
success for U.S. efforts. As usual; however; ·problems existed; Brazil 
· was still trying desperately to establish a modus vivendi with Cuba, and 
abstained from the second resolution. 39 Brazil was joined in abstention 
by Bolivia and Mexico due to their limited view of the extent of legiti-
mate O.A.S. functions. 40 Thus, three consistent opponents of U.S. Cuban 
policy refused to change despite the dramatic turn of events then un-
folding. 
Despite these indications of dissention, the O.A.S, showed the 
strongest concensus concerning hemispheric defense that it had at any-
time since its inception. Six countries offered bases to aid the United 
States in their blockade. 41 Three countries offered naval support in-
cluding the usually reticent Argentina. 42 That country actually sailed 
38Pan American Union, Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
Applications, Vol. g, 1960-1964, (Wash., 1965), p. 112 
39Paul s. Hilbo, "Cold War Drift in. Latin America," Current History, 
February, 1963, p, 72, 
40crane, "Strategic Analysis," p. 544. 
41Hilbo, ''Cold War Drift," p, 72. 
42Pan American Union, Applications, p. 115. 
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ships to the quarantine area, as did the Dominican Republic.43 Brazil 
softened its stand somewhat when a brother of. President Goulart labeled 
Castro a Cuban quisling.44 
There were three reasons for O.A.S. unaniminity at this crucial 
juncture. 45 First, Kennedy made it clear that the confrontation was be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union, and not between the United 
States and Cuba. This stand served to temper the usual Latin American 
fear of Yankee intervention in a neighboring country. Second, the Latins 
had a genuine fear of nuclear weapons and simply did not want the Latin 
Americans to become involved in a nuclear arms race. Finally, the Latin 
Americans felt that Castro had betrayed their community by becoming in-
exorably involved with the Soviet Union. 
A final question remains to be answered concerning the role of the 
O.A.S. Given the limited role of the O.A.S. in the missile crisis, can 
anti--Soviet action be classified as multilateral, or was the O.A.S. role 
so insignificant that American action must be considered as unilateral. 
This latter view is expressed by Jerome Slater in his book evaluating 
the O.A.S. as a collective security organization. 46 However, another 
observer states thai; although the Organization of American States did 
support the U.S., it simply supported an essentiallyunilatez,al ac::tion, 47 
43Ibid.• pp. 178, 154. 
44Pachter, Collision Course, p, 39. 
45Robert J. Alexander, "Why President Kennedy was Right in the 
Cuban Crisis," New Politics, January 1963, p. 46. 
46Jerome Slater, A Reevaluation of Collective Security (Columbus, 
1965), p. 34. 
47Robert N. Burr, Our Troubled Hemisphere (Washington, 1967), 
p. 69. 
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Generally, Latin Americans considered the action as multilateral. 
Jos~ Mora, the Secretary-General of the O.A.S., stated that any measures 
taken by the United States to dismantle bas13s in Cuba would be "multi-
lateral measures, with multilateral support. 11 48 An articulate Latin 
American writer argues that there was general agreement among Latins 
that the U.S. should invade Cuba. 49 
The resolution of October 23 did make the quarantine a multilateral 
action. That is why Kennedy so desperately required O.A.S, support for 
his quarantine and why he did not initiate it until he had O,A,S. ap-
proval. On the other hand, the physical role of the Latin American na-
tions was minimal. Some considered that Kennedy initiated a 1..!,nilateral 
quarantine because he could not cou.nt on 0,A.S. support. 50 Others take 
an opposing vie)w and call the O.A.S, action in the missile crisis the 
finest hour of the Monroe Doctrine, that it was not a multilateral docu-
ment.51 In this writer's opinion, the United States acted consistently 
with the Monroe Doctrine even though it was not specifically mentioned, 
and with considerable O.A.S, support. That support was a helpful element 
in the crisis. 
48Mezerik, Cuba, p. 91. 
49victor Alba, "A False Crisis,"~ Politics, January, 1963, 
p. 29. 
50Hilbo, "Cold War Drift," p. 72. 
51Thomas and Thomas, The Organization of American States, p. 361. 
CHAPTER VII 
POST-CRISIS DEVELOPMENTS 
In the period from the missile crisis to·the present, the United 
States-Soviet·conflict concerning Cuba has apparently achieved some 
level of stability. In 1964, Senator Fulbright referred to Cuba as a 
nuisance rather than a threat. 1 His analysis was valid to the extent 
that Cuba was no longer a military threat to the United States. 
Both United States and O.A.S. attitudes toward Soviet influence in 
the hemisphere showed a high degree of consistency in this period de-
spite the occurrence of several.new and significant events involving 
_:. . . .. 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic. ·· 
United States Policy 
American policy toward Soviet inflllence in Cuba was based on two 
main assumptionsdur,i.ng this period; that time was an asset, and that 
U.S. moderation would encourage a commensurate Soviet moderation,2 Ac-
cordingly, U.S. policy was consistent, but cautious. 
State Department policy makers viewed the problem on two levels. 
In the long view,·washington considered that the hemisphere as an ideai 
1senator Fulbright in Dexter Perkins, The United States and~ 
Caribbean (Cambridge, 1966), ~· 148. 
2Robert D. Crane, "A Strategib Analysis of American and Soviet 
Policy," Orbis, April, 1963, p. 553. 
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breeding grounds for international communism, and that improved social 
welfare would be helpful in creating an environment unfavorable for com-
munists. It was hoped that the Alliance for Progress would be effective 
in decreasing the political, social and economic problems of Latin Ameri-
ca. However, little was done financially to implement the long range 
goal. 
As a more immediate goal, the.United States sought the political 
and economic isolation of Cuba.3 Politically, the United States pursued 
its isolation policy in the Organization of American States, and at-
tempted to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the Cuban example to the 
Western Hemisphere. In 1964, after Cuba had been accused of aggressive 
activities against Venezuela, Secretary Rusk proposed to the O.A.S. that 
Castro be warned, sanctions be taken against him, and that appropriate 
steps be taken in the field of trade. 4 In 1967, Venezuela again accused 
Cuba of violating its sovereignty. This time, Rusk's proposals to the 
O.A.S, were a little more specific. They included condemnation of 
Castro, increased military vigilance, and a resolution that would at-
tempt to limit economic and political support for Castro by non-members 
5 of the O.A.S. 
3This isolation policy is expressed quite clearly in U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Cuba, Latin America and Communism, by Edwin Martin, 
Inter-American Series No. 86 (Washington, 1964). 
4u.s. Department of State, "O.A.S. Approves Rio Treaty Measures 
Against Castro Regime," by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, 
August 10, 1964, p, 178. 
5Ibid., "O.A.S. Foreign Ministers Take Steps Against Cuban Sub-
version," Statements.by Secretary Rusk, State Department Bulletin, 
October 16, 1967, pp, 490-493, 
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The economic ise>lation of Cuba had th:r;,ee major goals.6 First was 
to demonstrate to Latin America the American position that communism was 
gener~lly evil and could not succeed. Hopefully, this would block pos-
sible Soviet gains in other Latin American countries. A second goal was 
to demonstrate to indigenous Cubans that Castro was an evil and ineffec-
tual leader. A final goal was to make Soviet involvement in Cuba as 
costly as possible for the Soviet Union. ~y all indications this por-
tion of the program was a success as Cuba came to rely more and more on 
Soviet trade and aid. In the four year period preceding 1963, the num-
ber of non-Soviet foreign ships docking at Havana for trade purposes de-
creased by 60 per cent,7 
Although the American policy was moderate with respect to Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic crisis of 1965 demonstrated U.S. willingness to use 
more forceful measures if the United States considered that its security 
was generally threatened by communism of any sort. The American policy 
reflected the belief that, "The American nations cannot, must not, and 
will not permit the establishment of .another communist government in the 
western hemisphere •118 In this case,. the "American nations" referred to 
a unilateral action by the United States. Although U •. s. troops were 
ostensibiy sent to the Dominican Republic to protect American citizens, 
there is evidence that the AmeriQaI} action was to. prevent another Cuba, 
The United States assumed the rebellion was led by Cuban communists and 
6u.s •. Department of State, United States Policy Toward~' by 
George W. Ball, Inter-American Series No. 88 (Washington, 1964), p. 12. 
7Ibid., p. 17. 
8President Johnson, in U.S. Department of State, Dominican Crisis, 
Inter~American Series No. 92 (Washington, 1965). 
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acted to prevent its success. 9 Secretary Rusk admitted on May 8 that 
the U.S. intent was to prevent the "irreversible process" of communiza-
tion until the O.A.S. could become effective. 1° Connell-Smith has of-
fered an excellent description relating Johnson's reaction in the Domin-
ican crisis to United States experience in Cuba. 
It would hardly be surprising if Mr. Johnson concluded 
from the Cuban experience that the only way to prevent 
the emergence of a second Castro was for the United 
States to act swiftly in any situation where a com-
munist take-over of another Latin American country 
seemed likely. The United States could not rely up-
on her allies to accept her judgement as to when the 
situation had arisen, but few would oppose her once 
she was committed.11 
American action in the Dominican Republic reaffirmed its willing-
ness to resort to unilateral military means to prevent a situation in 
the Caribbean that Washington considered adverse to American interests. 
In taking this action, the United States was only adding new expression 
to its traditional policy in this area. 
Defense Posture 
George Lowe has commented that the United States continued to in-
crease its conventional forces after the missile crisis due to the use-
fulness of the military in that crisis. 12 While tnis statement may 
ascribe too much influence to the military's role in Cuba, it is 
9Theodore c. Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," Commentary, June, 
1965, pp. 40, 46. 
10u,s. Department of State, Dominican Crisis. 
llGordon Connell-Smith, "The O.A.S. and the Dominican Republic," 
World Today, Junel965, p. 234. 
12George E. Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston, 1964), p. 256, 
74 
difficult to see how the U.S. administration could overlook the value 
that military force had as a tool of diplomacy. "A force posture which 
is militarily ineffectual is po~itically valueless. 1113 A corollary to 
this postulate is that the credibility of a force structure is in direct 
proportion to that force's utility on the diplomatic front. Apparently 
the United States was pleased with its flexible force as it has been 
continued basically unchanged since 1962, as the following examples 
illustrate; 
In 1963, Secretary McNamara explained pis understandin~ of flexible 
response. 
If we were to consider a spectrum of the possible 
. cases of Communist· aggression, then, ranging from 
· harrassment, covert aggression, and indirect chal-
lenge at one end of the scale to the massive inva-
sion of Western Europe or a full scale nuclear at-
tack on the other end, it is· clear that our nuclear 
superiority has been and should continue to be an 
effective deterrent to aggression at the high end 
of the spectrum. It is equally clear, on the other 
hand, that at the very low end of the spectrum a 
nuclear response may not be fully credible and 
that nuclear power alone cannot be an effective 
deterrent at this level in the future any more than 
it has been in the past.14 
In this same address, Mc,Namara stated that regardless of U.S. defense 
spending, the Soviet Union could continue to inflict serious nuclear 
damage on the United States.15 This recognition of diminishing returns 
from an increased nuclear force led to a gradual decrease in military 
.. 
13P. o. Mikshe, IIThe Nuclear Deterrent and Western Strategy," 
Orbis, Summer, 1964, p. 236. 
14u, S, Department of State, IIMajor National Security Problems 
Confrontipg the United States," by Secretary McNamara, State Department 
Bulletin, December 16, 1963, p. 918. 
15 • · Ibld. , p. 916. 
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spending. 
In reviewing the accomplishments of four years of Democratic govern-
ment, President Johnson noted in 1965 that Army Special Forces had been 
increased 8 times, Army divisions were up 45 per cent, Marine personnel 
had increased by 15,000 men, and tactical air forces had been doubled. 16 
He further stated that the United States "now possesses a range of credi-
ble, usable military power enabling us to deal with every form of mili-
tary challenge from guerrilla terrorism to thermonuclear war. 1117 While 
much of th.is expansion was due to the V.i,etnam conflict, it could be 
argued that the utility of conventional forces in the missile crisis may 
have reinforced the original "flexible response" doctrine, 
The budget fbr fiscal year 1966 showed a decrease of two billion 
dollars from the previous year. 18 The decrease was absorbed almost en-
tirely by nuclear forces, in line with the adminstration's attempt to 
de-escalate the nuclear arms race. 
As recently as October, 1967, the United States defense concepts 
continued relatively stable. 
What is important to understand is that our nuclear 
strategic forces play a vital and absolutely neces-
sary role in our security and that of our allies 
but it is an intrinsicaily limited role, 
Thus, we and our allies must maintain substantial 
conventional forces fully capable of dealing with 
a wide spectrum of lesser forms of political and 
military aggression--a level of aggression against 
which the use of strategic nuclear forces would not 
be to our advantage and thus 9 level of aggression 
l 6congressional Quarterly Survey, Congressional g_ W Report, January, 
22, 1965, p. 94, 
17Ibid. 
18rbid., February 19, 1965, p, 313. 
which there strategic nuclear forces by themselves 
cannot effectively d,eter. One cannot fasµion a 
credible deterrent out qf an incredible action. 
Therefore, security for the United States and its 
all.~es can only arise from the possession of a 
wh.ile ·· range of graduated deterrents~ each of them 
fully.credible in its own content.l 
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The United States belief in the utility of strong conventional 
forces.was p,robably reinforced by the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965. 
There are indication$ that President Johnson made an early decision not 
to permit the establishmef!t of the rebels led by J\,lan.Bosch on the basis 
that they were oriented towards communism~20 When a military j\,lnta in-
formed the United States that they could not guarantee the safety of 
American citizens in the Dominican Republic, Johnson responded by send-
ing 20,000 troops to that troubled island, ostensibly to protect Ameri-
can citizens.21 Regardless of American intentions in this affair, it 
seems that by committing a large n~mber of troops the United States was 
able to control events, at least until the O.A.S. became involved. As 
in the Cuban crisis of 1962, military forces were used to help accomplish 
political ends. 
The Organization of American States: Decisions and Cqnflicts 
Based on the events of October 1962, anq on the rapid and decisive 
19u.s. Department of State, "The Dynamics of Nuclear St:r;,ategy," 
by Secretary McNamara, State Department Bulletin, October 9, 1967, p. 
445. 
20Draper, "The Dominican Crisis," p. 39. In this article, Draper 
vehemently attacks the U.S. position. Be offers evidence that events 
in the Dominican Republic were ma~i,pulated with one goal in mind, to 
prevent the establishment of any govermnent that would be sympathetic 
to communists. 
21The Association of the.Bar of the: City of New York, The Dominicart 
Crisis (Dobbs Ferry, 1967)~ p. 7. 
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O.A.S. reaction to those events, it would be reasonable to anticipate a 
more aggressive anti-communist attitude by that organization, and such 
has been the case. However, despite continued accusations of aggressive 
and subversive communist activities emanating from Cuba, the O.A.S. has 
been unable to act strongly without encountering internal divisive 
forces. 
The missile ~risis proved to be a specific reaction to a very ex-
plicit military threat to the hemisphere, it did not indicate a turning 
point in the general attitude of the member nations of the O.A.S. Less 
than a year after the missile crisis, the following analysis of the 
O.A.S. was given. 
As long as many members of the O.A.S. fail to come to 
grips with the substance of the communist problem, 
the O.A.S. is sitting on a rumpling volcano. That a 
unified O.A.S. could aid the hemisphere of communist 
imperialism and could prevent its further encroach-
ment in this area of the world is unquestionable. 
That it has not done so to date does not nullify the 
organization, but its failure in face of the advanc-
ing enemy is seriously weakening it to a point where 
eventual resistance may come too late. 22 
Late in 1963, the O.A.S. faced a new test concerning Cuban agres-
sion. Venezuela claimed it was being subj~cted to Cuban S\lbversive 
activities on its soil, and in December requested a convocation of the 
Organ of Consultation. 23 A committee was formed to investigate Venezu-
ela's claims. Their findings corroborated Venezuela's claim completely. 
They found that Cuban leaders were involved in a Venezuelan insurrection, 
22Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J, Thomas, Jr.,~ Organization of 
American States (Dallas, 1963), p. 407 
23Pan American Union, Inter-Ameri_can Treatz £f_ Reciprocal Assist-
~ Applications,~·.!!., 1960-1964 (Washingtin, 1965), p. 181. 
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that Cuba was a training center for insurgents, and that the Cuban 
government aided sabotage efforts. 24 Despite·this evidence, the O.A.S. 
could not seem to even ag~ee to convoke the appropriate organ. The 
military coup in Brazil finally gave impetus to the organization and the 
Ninth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs was 
convoked in July, seven months after the original request.25 
Controversy concerning the resolution of this meeting led to what 
26 has been labeled the most serious split in O.A.S. history, Colombia 
took a firm position, advocating all sanctions short of armed. attack on 
Cuba. Mexico,.on the other hapd, claimed that the O.A.S. had no juris-
diction at all since Cuba was no longel;' a member of the O.A.S. If the 
.o.A,.S. did apply sc;lnc;tions, Mexico threatened to ignore the resolution 
completely despite the O.A.S. Charter :requirement of compliance with a 
resolution receiving two-thirds of the votes. Argentina offered a 
watered-down resolution that would provide a compromise solution. It 
proved to be unacceptable to both sides, however. 27 Apparently, the· 
O.A.S. would have to choose between a strong resolution that could be 
disruptive to that organization, or ignore the Cuban challenge alto-
gether. 
Arthur Whitaker offers an extensive explanation for the hesitancy 
within the O.A.S. First was the problem of an articulate opposing 
24Arthur P. Whitaker, "Cuba's Intervention in Venezuela: A Test 
of the O.A.S. ," Orbis, 1964, p. 511. 
25Ibid., p. 514. 
26Max Azicri, "The O.A.S. and the Communist Challenge," Communist 
Affairs, April, 1965, p. 8. 
27whitaker, "Cuba's .Intervention in Cuba," p. 529. 
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faction. The bloc supporting Mexico numbered only five. However, it 
included Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, influential countries 
representing a large population. The O.A.S. was reluctant to oppose 
these countries by a firm resolution against Cuba. These countries, in 
turn, were effected by their domestic political situation. A second 
problem was the form that sanctions could or should take. Did the O.A.S. 
have legal authority to take any action? SQould they recommend sanctions 
or make them mandatory? What specific sanctions should.be resolved? A 
final problem was the recurring one qf fear of intervention. The normal 
O.A.S. reluctance to invade the sovereignty of another Latin American 
country was accompanied by a particular fear of U.S. power and concern 
with suspected involvement of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. De-
spite evidence to the contrary, there was some belief that the whole 
case was a CIA ploy. 28 
The O.A.S •. chose to pass a st~ong resolution despite the inner con-
flicts. Cuba wa~ condemned as an aggressor and held responsible for 
intervention in Venezuela. O.A.S. members were instructed to break 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, to ~uspend all trade except for humani-
tarian reasons, and to close all sea transportation. The measures were 
softened somewhat by a statement that the sanctions would be removed 
when Cuba ceased to be a threat ~o the hemisphere. A very significant 
resolution warned that: 
The member states shall preserve their essential 
rights as sovereign states by the use of self-
defense in either individual or collective form, 
which could go as far as resort to armed force •••• 
A final portion of the resolution urge~ non-members to reevaluate their 
28Ibid~, pp. 517-523. 
position with regard to Cuba.29 
On the portion of the final resolution dealing with sanctions, 
Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay voted in the negative. 30 Likewise 
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a declaration ta the Cuban people urging them to throw off their com-
munist yoke received three abstentions. 31 However, by the end of 1964, 
·all Latin American ~ountr,.i,.es, except Mexico, had broken relations with 
Cuba and ceased all trade.32 Mexico continued to ignore its responsi-
bilities under the O.A.S. Charter. Despite the strength of the resolu-
tion, the debate concerning the resolution indicated a deep seated di-
vision within the organization. 
The Dominican crisis served to bring this division into more dra-
matic relie{. Even before the Organ pf Consultation convened, the United 
States was accused by Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela of violating the 
O.A.S. Charter by intervention in a domestic crisis.33 The United States 
countered this argument by claiming that the Dominican Republic was under 
attack from external forces, namely Cuba, and the United States was help-
ing to repel the attack in the spirit of basic O.A.S. documents. 34 
Nonetheless, anti-United States feeling remained quite strong. An 
0. A. S, resolution which condoned the American po.si tion by establishing a 
29Pan American Union, App.lications, p, 185. 
3011Ninth Meeting of Consultation," Americas, September 1964, p. 1. 
31Ibid., p, 2. 
32Edwin Lieuwen, United States Poiicy !!!, Latin America (New York, 
1965), p. 101. 
33connell-Smith, "The O.A.S,," p, 234. 
34The Association of the Bar of the city of New York, Dominican 
Crisis, p, 30. 
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multilateral peace force in the Dominican Republic passed with only the 
minimum number of votes required. The usual dissentions of Mexico, 
Chile, and Uruguay was joined by ~cuador and Peru. In addition, Venezu-
ela abstained. 35 · 
Despite the heavy opposition, the O.A.S. was quite helpful in eas-
ing the crisis in the Dominican Republic. It first formalized a cease 
fire and later sent a five nation peace force headed by Brazii. 36 
Ultimately this force was instrumental in establishing a provisional 
government. 37 
In the post-missile crisis era, the O.A.S. proved that it could 
act and, in fact, a majority of its members $Upported all anti-communist 
proposals urged by the Vnited States. It did so, however, at the cost 
of perhap$ irreparable damage to the solidarity of that organization. 
35connell-Smith, "The O.A.S.," P• 235. 
36Pan American Union, Report of the Secretary-General of the Organ-
ization of American States Regarding the Dominican Situation(Washington, 
1965), pp.'° 2, 16. 
37u.s. Department of State, "O.A.S. Achieves Reconciliation in 
Dominican Republic," statements by President Johnson, State Department 




In the Introduction, four hypotheees were stated to provide the 
orientation and q:irection for this study. The first, that American pol-
icy has been partially successful in limiting Soviet gains in Cu.ha, ap-
pears to be valid. The authorrecpgnizesthat it is a difficult task to 
evaluate the effectiveness of a nation's foreign policy, and particu-
larly so when major events are of such recent occurrence. As recently 
as late 1967, Cuba was again accused of subversion and aggression in 
Venezuela and Cuba's "Che" Guevara was involved in the Bolivian up-
rising.1 The problem is further complicated by the presence of a third 
nation. The United States is, and has been, attempting to neutralize 
the attempts of the Soviet Union to gain· influence in Cuba. Simulta-
neously, however, the United States needs to construct a specific policy 
toward Cuba since there are indications that Cuba does not perform as a 
puppet of the u.s.s.R. but rather~ at times, acts in opposition to the 
desires of the Soviet Union. 
Bilateral foreign policy should not be treated as a zero sum game. 
It is possible that both sides can gain~ or conversely lose. In evalu-
ating the missile crisis, for example, it is tempting to call it a clear 
cut victory for the United States since it prevented installation of 
1Pan American Union~ Twelfth M~eting ~Consultation~ Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1968), p. 1, · 
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missile sites and certainly causf;!d embarrai;;sment to the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, depending on their goals, the Soviet Union may have 
also made significant gains. It has been suggested that in 1962 the 
Soviets attempted the impossible and settled for the improbable.2 
Khrushchev, in speaking of the miss.i,.le crisis scoffed at tne idea of a 
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Soviet defeat on the basis that socialism was preserved in Cuba, a verbal 
non-invasion pledge was secured and the Soviets lost nothing. 3 
If the U.S. policy is viewed from the point of view of Soviet gains 
in Latin America, and specifically in Cuba, it is tempting to classify 
that policy as a failure since communist influence is a more significant 
force in Latin American politics than it was prior to the rise of 
Castro. However, while several Latin American countries did have signif-
icant communist elements, many of these elements are indigenous radical 
reformers rather than strict puppets of the Kremlin. With the excep-
tion of Cuba, Latin America is not under the Soviet sphere of influence 
or likely to be there in the foreseeable future. To the extent that the 
United States has been able to contain Soviet influence in the Western 
Hemisphere, U.S. policy has been successful. To the extent that the 
communists have made ideological gains, the United States considers that 
their policy has failed. 
It is not possible at this time to make. a final analysis of U.S. 
policy in Cuba since the situation is still dynamic. A residual ques-
tion is whether the United States can contipue to prove to Latin America 
2Robert D. Crane, "A Strategic An~lysis of American and Soviet 
Policy," Orbis, April, 1963, p. 548. 
3Henry M. Pachter, CoJ,.lisionCourse The Cuban Missile Crisis and 
Coexistence (New York, 1963), p. 117. 
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that it can meet Latin American needs to a greater degree than the 
Soviet Union. In a complex and ambiguous political world, it is con-
ceivable that a clear cut victory or defeat may never emerge from the 
conflict. Indeed, the United States and the Soviet Uni9n may yet reach 
. ' . . a cold war understanding vis-a-vis Latin America. 
A second hypothesis is that American policy in Cuba has been guided 
by clearly stated interests that are considered by U.S. policy makers to 
be vital to national security. The hypothesis is valid and, historj-
cally, the American policy toward the Caribbean area has been remarkably 
consistent in its orientation to preserve the national security of the 
United Sta.tes. 
So predominant has been the security factor in our 
dealings with the Caribbean countries, that the 
United States evolved, albeit somewhat emperically, 
a pattern of methods and techniques possessing such 
a high degree of coherence, consistency, and single-
ness of gurpose as to constitute a general policy 
posture. . 
The State Department has published numerous statements and documents 
expressing its interest in Cuba and its displeasure concerning the 
Soviet influence in Cuba. These documents were underscored by various 
actions such as the Bay of Pigs episode, the missile crisis, and the 
Dominican intervention. 
The Monroe Doctrine has :qeen c;l significant factor in U.S. policy. 
Although this doctrine is t,tnpopular with Latin Americans, instances such 
as the missile crisis of 1962 and the Dominican situation of 1965 demon-
strate that some form of the doctrine continues to be basic to American 
policy toward Latin America. 
4J. Lloyd Mecham, The United States and Inter-American Securitz., 
1889-1960 (Austin, 196lr:--p. 241. 
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Unquestionably, part of the U.S. concern with Soviet influence in 
Cuba was due to the communist oveFtones involved. However, it is the 
opinion of this author that the United States would have opposed the 
presence of the Soviet Union in Cuba even if the U.S.S.R. did not happen 
to be a communist country. This opposition would be based on tradition-
al rejection of extra-hemispheric influences in the Caribbean. 
The third hypothesis p~oposed at the start of this study suggested 
that U.S. policy })as bee:q enhanced by a favorable military posture with 
respect to the Caribbean area. Since the turn of the century, the 
United States has been the military means to en:f;'orce i,ts will in the 
Caribbean. This military superiority has been due to an effective, or 
at least potentially effective, military force, and to a proximity to 
the Caribbean compared to an ~xtra-hemispheric force. In the 1950s, the 
U.S. military superiority suffered from a credibility gap due to an 
over reliance on nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional forces. 
The lack of emphasis upon maintaining a strong conventional force limited 
the possibilities of U.S. action against Castro or the Soviet Union. It 
has been reported that one reason President Kennedy was adverse to using 
American troops during th~ Bay of Pigs episode was a deficiency in troop 
strength. 5 If the military was used in Cuba., there would be no contin-
gency forces availab+e for action in Asia or other trouble spots tnat 
the United States consider~d as being more vital than Cuba was at that 
time. 
During 1961 and 1962, th~ United States developed a much stronger 
conventioria~ force. This force was a deterrent to the Soviet Union 
5William F. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York, 1964), p. 
269. 
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during the Cuban crisis and actual,ly-was used in the Dominican Republic. 
Since 1962, the United States has had both a nuclear superiority over 
the Soviet Union and a superior ability to protect its interests in the 
Western Hemisphere with conventional ground, air, and naval forces. 
It would appear that today the United States is in a favorable 
power position in the Caribbean. It has a well stated vested interest, 
and the physical means to protect it. However; U.S. actions are temper-
ed by hemispheric and international co~siderations. 
The fourth hypothesis, thijt the actions and resolutions of the 
O.A.S. have served to reinforce Afl!erican efforts to frustrate Soviet 
goals in Cuba, has not stood the scrutiny of the foregoing chapters. 
Prior to the 196~ missile cri1:ds, tlle O.A.S •. seemed unable or un-
willing to develop a firm anti,-Castro policy. Whereas the United States 
has viewed the hemispheric p:riop,l.em as. one c;,f security, various Latin 
American nations have been primarily conc~~ned with non-.i,ntervention and 
economic growth, and have not viewed Castro as a threat to hemispheric 
security. 
·Although the missile crisis brought about a strong r~solution with 
almost.complete unanj,.mity, it appears to represent an isolated event. 
O.A.S. action since the crisis has been positive, but at the expense of 
schism. Some fifteen nations are in accord with the United States ef-
fo:i:,ts to rid the hem.i,sphere of communist influences while the remainder 
are, for various reasons, in some degree of opposition. 
From the point of view of U.S. policy makers, the O.A.S. has been 
an inhibiting force on American actions. Washington has had to measure 
its unilateral actions against the standard of its neighbors. In the 
cases where a significant number of neighbors have opposed U.S. policy, 
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and this has been almost every case, the United States has had to choose 
between forcing the action and e~acerbating its relations with Latin 
America, or simply not acting. 
In retrospect, the American policy has been forged by three prob-
lems. First, and foremost in the minds of U.S. policy makers, has been 
the need, to protect American national interests by keeping the Western 
Hemisphe;r-e free from external influence that could threaten American 
secur.i.ty, This problem has been the basis of all U.S. policy toward 
tatin America, The second challenge that the United States has had to 
meet is to act·in national and hemispheri<; interests while avoiding the 
label 'of "meddler". This requires development of hemispheric cooperation 
which may at times moderate actions that the United States might take if 
it was acting solely on a unilateral basis. The third problem has been 
to elimina~e, or at least reduce, the socio-economic conditions in Latin 
America that lead to communism. Programs such as the Alliance for Pro-
gress have provided a token response to this problem. 
American policy toward Soviet influence in Cuba has been consistent 
with its overall Latin American policy, That policy has been essentially 
reactionary and has been determined by the degree of threat to what the 
United States considered to be its national security, the size and credi-
bility of its military force, and the attitudes of the Organization of 
American States, It is anticipated that these three elements will con-
tinue to be essential determinants of U.S. policy in the foreseeable 
future. 
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